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Abstract 
On 15 February 2003, more than one million people had taken to the streets of 
London to protest against the prospect of war. Later that month, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair faced the largest parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred 
years where 121 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government’s 
policy of  support  for  US military action against  Iraq.  Blair  has faced a fierce 
opposition from Britain’s major partners in Europe—France and Germany—who 
believed  that  the  unilateral  decision  of  Blair’s  government  to  go  to  war  has 
undermined  Britain’s  pivotal  role  of  providing  a  bridge  of  understanding 
between Europe and the United States and damaged the multilateral approach to 
world problems. Prime Minister Blair even faced personal attacks in the media 
which threatened his political survival.
Facing  such  constraints,  it  would  have  been  conceivable  if  the  Blair-led 
government had taken a less determined position on Iraq. But that was not the 
case. Ignoring the UN, the public, the party, the parliament, and the EU partners, 
Blair decided enthusiastically to join the war, not only verbally but militarily.   
In an attempt to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision making in the Iraq War 
2003, I recall the underpinnings of Tony Blair’s Third Way Labour (New Labour) 
which  I  expect  to  assist  me  in  understanding  Blair’s  decision.  Principles  of 
humanitarian  intervention,  international  community,  multilaterism  and 
interconnectedness between domestic and foreign policies resonated in his New 
Labour discourse. Putting these principles into the Iraq war test, I discovered an 
exacerbating gulf between this policy and Blair’s actual political action on the 
ground.  
IV
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Faced with a  challenging dilemma and trying to  understand that  dilemma,  I 
formulated the thesis hypothesis which stated that Blair used the New Labour 
teachings in his discourse to knit a list of pretexts and justifications in an attempt 
to manipulate his public, party members, and parliament into believing in the 
legality of the war. This in turn would conceal the real reasons of intervention 
behind a  screen of  pluralist  and moral  rhetoric  devising  evidence  to  support 
decisions that had already been agreed upon especially at the level of Blair-Bush. 
Methodologically and through the use of both primary and secondary data,  I 
exploited three international relations perspectives suggested by a first analysis 
of Blair’s New Labour Policy and discourse. These are normative, pluralist and 
realist perspectives. Both the first and second perspectives failed to unravel the 
dilemma and explain Blair’s  decision in the Iraq war due to the fact that  the 
actual performance on the ground violated the moral values of peace, human 
rights,  and  democracy.  It  also  undermined  the  credibility  of  the  UN  as  an 
international organization, damaged the multilateral approach to world issues 
and neglected  (through Blair’s  prime ministerial  style  of  leadership)  both the 
public and parliament; the very basis of a democratic nation. 
The thesis then, through relating the resultant hypothesis with the assumptions 
of the realist school of thought mainly bandwagoning, public opinion and power 
of  interests,  contends  that  Blair’s  real  motivation  behind  the  Iraq  war  was 
advancement of British interests through tightening the relationship with the US 
hegemon . These interests are composed but not limited to the nuclear build-up 
(and what relates to Britain’ security and survival), unrestricted flow of oil (and 
what  relates  to  Britain’s  economic  and  industrial  prosperity),  and  Britain’s 
influential role in the international arena as a pivotal power.       
V
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الملخص التنفيذي        
، انطلق ما يقارب المليون بريطاني إلى شوارع لندن معربين عن معارضتهم لقرار 3002 شباط 51في 
 من نفس الشهر، شهدت بريطان يا أضخم ثورة برلمان ية في تاريخها حين قرر32الحرب على العراق. وفي 
 عضو^ا الت صويت ضد قرار الحكو مة خوض الحرب. و في ن فس المضمار، تعالت أ صوات الدول121
 الوروب ية الحلي فة لبريطان يا- أمثال فرن سا وألمان يا- منددة بقرار بل ير أحاديا^ النضمام لبوش في حر به على
 ) التي تشدد على لعب دور الجسر الذي7991العراق منافيا^ بذلك تعاليم طريقه الثالث (حزب العمال الجديد 
 ير بط ب ين ض فتي الطلن طي وال تي تنادي ب حل متعدد الطراف للمشا كل الدول ية. إن بل ير بقراره خوض
الحرب عرض وحدته مع أوروبا للخطر كما عرض حياته السياسية للفشل الذريع.
 بالنظر إلى هذه الخلفية، يكون من الواضح فهمه أن يمتنع بلير عن جر بلده لحرب تواجه مثل هذه الحدة في
المعارضة من كافة الطراف. ال أن بلير تحدى الجميع ليقف في صف الشريك التاريخي، الوليات المتحدة.
 في محاولة ل فهم قرار بل ير، التجأت لم سح أولي لتعال يم الطر يق الثالث تلك وال تي من المم كن أن يكون قد
 استند إليها بلير في الوصول إلى قراره. لكن ما تكشف عنه البحث هو تناقض واضح بين ما السياسة التي
 بني على أساسها الطريق الثالث وبين الواقع على الرض. فبينما تحث تلك التعاليم على نشر القيم الخلقية
 واحترام المؤسسات الدولية وتبني الحل المتعدد الطراف للقضايا الدولية واحترام أسس الديموقراطية، نرى
أن بلير لم يتقيد بهذه التعاليم في الحرب على العراق بل وناقضها تماما^ في بعض الحالت.
 هل من الممكن ان يكون بل ير متناقض^ا في سياسته الخارجية؟ وإن كان هناك تناقض^ا   حقيقيا^، كيف نستطيع
تفسيره؟ 
 من خلل البحث، قمت بصياغة الفرضية لتفسير المعضلة وهي أن بلير استخدم الخطاب التعددي والخلقي
 الموجو د في تعال يم الطر يق الثالث لتج سيد جمل ة من الذرائع ي ستطي ع من خلل ها  إقناع شع به وحكوم ته
 والمجت مع الدولي أن ما يقوم ب ه هو ال حل ال صواب والشر عي. ل كن ما يخ قي ت حت هذه الجمل ة من الذرائع
 المنية والخلقية والدولية دوافع حقيقة جيوسياسية حسب ما يكشفه البحث عند تفنيد هذه الذرائع واحدة تلو
الخرى.
IV
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  وكمنهجية لثبات هذه الفرضية باستخدام كل من المراجع الول ية والثانوية، استعرضت ثلث مدارس في
 العلقات الدولية أل وهي المدرسة المعيارية، والمدرسة التعددية والمدرسة الواقعية وذلك لن دراسة أولية
 لل سياسة الخارجية البريطان ية الموجودة ضمن تعال يم الطريق الثلث تل مح لحتمال ية ا ستخدام هذه المدارس
 في ت فسير هذه ال سياسة. ك ما ان هذه المدارس تمتلك القوة الن فسيرية القادرة على ت فسير أ سباب الحرب من
عدة جوانب.
  وب عد ت طبيق تعال يم كل من هذه المدارس على قرار بل ير ال سياسي خوض الحرب، ن ستنتج أن المدر ستين
 الولى والثان ية ف شلت ا في ت فسير القرار كليا^ ل سباب ن ذكر من ها عدم قدرة المدر ستين على ت فسير انتهاك
 المنظومة الخلق ية خلل الحرب وإهمال صوت الشعب والحكومة والمجت مع الدولي ممثل^ بالمم المتحدة،
 بينما توصلت المدرسة الواقعية من خلل افتراضاتها(النحياز، الرأي العام ، قوة المصالح) التي ربطتها مع
 فرضية البحث ن فسه وأ سئلته إلى تحل يل كامل للسباب ال تي دف عت ببل ير إلى الحرب وال تي جعل ته ل يلت فت
جانبا^ للنتهاكات السالفة الذكر. 
 ويخلص البحث إلى أن السباب الحقيقية وراء انضمام بلير للحرب غير أبه بأي شئ آخر تتجسد  بمصالح
 بريطانيا العظمى التي تتجلى في تدعيم العلقة التاريخية المميزة مع الوليات المتحدة(خصوصا^ بعيد أحداث
  وهيمنة الوليات المتحدة على الساحة الدولية)وما ينتج عنها من مصالح إقتصادية وسياسية وعسكرية9/11
 أبرزها تقوية الترسانة النووية لبريطانيا وضمان الوفرة غير المقيدة (بأنظمة سياسية متحدية كالنظام
العراقي) للنقط، مصدر الطاقة الساسي للدول الصناعية أمثال بريطانيا.
IIV

I. Introduction
The decision by the Blair government to support the US in its invasion of Iraq 
made  many  academics,  observers,  journalists  and  commentators  try  to  give 
rational  explanations for seemingly unanswerable questions.  The decision has 
been perceived by some as a defining moment in the UK foreign policy, one that 
has caused great damage to Blair’s premiership.
Why did Blair  decide  to  join  the  US-led  invasion  against  Iraq  despite  public 
protest, parliamentary revolt, party opposition and European objection? Why did 
he choose to subordinate to the US knowing that this might incur a high political 
cost  domestically?  Why  did  Blair  not  adopt  a  more  diplomatic  and  less 
militaristic approach to show support to the US, on one hand, but that would 
have been less costly, at the same time? Why did he, as a Leftist New Labourist, 
rely  on  the  right  both  in  the  parliament  and  the  public  opinion  to  gain  the 
support for his already-taken-decision? Why did he not, as a democratic leader, 
involve the public in the decision-making process of going to war through, for 
example, a referendum?  
Although on  February 15,  2003,  an  estimated one million people  took to  the 
streets  of  Britain’s  major  cities  to  protest  against  the  looming  conflict,  Blair 
insisted on going to war alongside the Conservative American leader. Despite his 
decreasing  personal  ratings  in  opinion  polls,  which  showed strong majorities 
opposed  to  any  war  without  the  authorization  of  the  United  Nations,  Blair 
commented that this was the price of conviction. In the face of fierce objection 
from his most important European allies: France and Germany, Blair decided to 
join the war. In addition, a debate in the House of Commons in the same month 
showed 121 Labour MPs vote against war who by the end of February reached 
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200  warning  the  Prime  Minister  of  an  even  larger  rebellion.  Nonetheless,  he 
described this as the cost of leadership. In fact,  he did not accept “No for an 
answer”, (Stephans 2004, 234). On March 18, 2003, Blair spoke to the Parliament 
with great confidence in which his New Labourist rhetoric of multilaterism and 
ethics strive was exploited to incur the required majority supporting his decision 
to go to the war1. 
Observing this context closely through the international news motivated me to 
look for answers and try to explain the reason behind Blair’s insistence on joining 
the war despite such consistent domestic and regional disturbances. Through my 
review of the available literature, I noticed that there were three basic arguments 
that Blair has offered for intervention -the security case, the global case and the 
modernizing case for war (Hogget 2005, 418). All three were described by Blair in 
his crucial speech to the House of Commons on March 18, 2003. The security case 
hinges  upon  a  concept  of  threat  posed  by  Saddam’s  weapons  of  mass 
destruction;  this  threat,  however,   failed  to  distinguish  between  what  is 
potentially  a threat  and what  is  imminent;  a  fact  which caused criticism and 
investigations about the truth of the whole case. The global strategic case hinges 
around the idea that the UK should work closely with the US to minimize its 
unilateralism  in  solving  world  issues  especially  the  ‘war  on  terrorism”. 
Conversely, this proved controversial when Blair decided deliberately to go to 
war without a UN authorization or consensus. The final case made by Blair is the 
modernizing moralizing case which has two aims of both exporting democracy 
and liberalism, on one hand, and appealing to humanitarian intervention, on the 
other  hand.  However,  this  did  not  constitute  a  solid  justification  taking  into 
1 Blair, Tony. 2003. Speech to the House of Commons in debate authorizing military actions against Iraq, 18 
March 2003. Available at: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3327.asp.(accessed on 15 
September 2005).  
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consideration the actual deeds that took place on the ground most importantly 
the long history of  supporting this dictate person of Saddam himself  and the 
likes, the years of sanctions, the random bombing and shelling of targets causing 
mass  killings,  the  prioritization to  protect  oil-related  premises  rather  schools, 
hospitals and museums, and the illegality of the war according the UN Charter.
Despite  the  counterarguments  which  I  summarized  above  challenging  Blair’s 
justifications, his arguments were said to be based in his Third Way Labourism 
proposed  by  him  in  1997  where  his  premiership  resonated  the  principles  of 
humanitarian  intervention,  international  community,  multilateralism  and 
interconnection between domestic and foreign policies. According to Coates and 
Krieger  (2004),  New Labour  harnesses  the  forces  of  globalization  to  advance 
internationalism,  multilateralism  and  cooperation  in  the  economic, 
environmental and security dimensions of foreign affairs. It promotes the idea 
that foreign and domestic policies are integrally connected by a set of principles 
entailing that being strong internationally requires being strong domestically. 
For Blair,  these same principles laid the ground for justifying the war against 
Saddam  Hussein.  However,  these  justifications  represented  in  the  “war  on 
terrorism, unregulated weapons of mass destruction, threat of a rogue regime 
and material defiance of the UN security council”(Coates and Krieger 2004, 66) 
caused  a  loud  public  controversy-  towards  the  end  of  the  war  especially 
following the  failure to  find any weapons of  mass destruction-  over  whether 
Blair’s government deliberately exaggerated the extent of the threat posed by the 
Iraqi  leader  and his  capabilities  (Stephans 2004,  xviii)  through relying on the 
governments  intelligence  reports  of  September 2002 and February 2003 in  an 
attempt to win the support of the public. 
7
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
This fact made me look deeper into the teachings of the Third Way Labourism 
and try to understand whether they really constitute the basis on which Blair 
rested his  case  or  they were  only exploited cleverly  by  him to  pass  his  own 
decision of going to war. In the following chapter, I make a comparison between 
Blair’s New Labour Policy, on one hand, and his actual political action on the 
ground in an attempt to test this. Discovering the gulf between the “policy” and 
the “politics”, I attempt to formulate a hypothesis based on the questions above: 
that Blair has used those teachings of his Third Way Labourism to formulate a 
list of pretexts and justifications in an attempt to manipulate his public, party 
members, and parliament into believing in the legality of the war. This in turn 
would conceal the real reasons of intervention behind a screen of liberal rhetoric 
devising  evidence  to  support  decisions  that  had  already  been  agreed  upon 
especially at the level of Blair-Bush. 
This hypothesis generated a list of questions in this same chapter that required 
me to exploit three different international relations viewpoints to understand the 
puzzle clearly.
The  first  explanation  was  proposed  by  many  authors  such  as  Kramer  who 
believed that  Blair  performs and decides based on his ethical  disposition and 
moral conviction that the world is lead by a set of values and principles. It is 
based in his Third Way Labourism that Britain should be a good citizen and a 
force for good in the world. Hence, one should act within this set to promote 
world  peace,  safety  and  security.  This  can  be  explained  from  the  normative 
viewpoint  of  international  relations  which  perceives  the  leader  as  a  moral 
politician  who  chooses  political  principles  that  are  consistent  with  those  of 
morality and ethical principles.  
8
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Many authors such as Coates and Krieger have also looked into the wordings of 
Blair’s speeches to try to understand his motivations. Blair’s speeches encouraged 
multilateral approach to world conflicts, justified the closeness to the US by the 
attempt to decrease its  unilateralism and respect  for international  institutions, 
defended the war as a just one aiming at alleviating the suffering of the poor and 
spreading democracy and economic welfare, believed that his behavior as a good 
citizen of the world spreading freedom and human rights is the basis by which 
he was elected by his people, the legitimizing power behind his premiership. To 
explain such trends,  I  attempted to use the pluralist  school  of  thought to try 
finding convincing reasoning for Blair’s decisions. Through relying on its main 
assumptions accentuating the impact of international institutions,   prioritizing 
the domestic system over the international system in trying to explain a certain 
act,  elaborating the insight that state-society relations- the relationship of states 
to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded- 
have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics and highlighting 
that state preferences, that is,  the fundamental social purposes underlying the 
strategic  calculations  of  governments…matters  most  in  world  politics” 
(Moravcsik 1997, 513), I tested whether this school can be applied to our case 
here and, thus explain the puzzle, or not. Criteria such as respect for international 
institutions,  societal  factors  such  as  the  public  and  party,  humanitarian 
intervention and human rights were used in this context.
Other authors attempted to find an explanation for Blair’s decisions in the Iraq 
through relying on the international structure and the power of interests. One 
such author is Azubuike (2003). According to Azubuike, 
9
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“The degree of zealousness with which Tony Blair committed himself and 
Britain  to  the  support  the  US campaign following the  September 11th 
terrorist attacks was impressive. In justifying that level of commitment, 
Blair with these principles of Third Way Labourism cited as his principal 
motivations the punishment of the perpetrators of the terrorist  attacks, 
and the eradication of the injustice,  poverty,  and sufferings that breed 
terrorism. Despite the persuasiveness of the argument,  these messianic 
motivations are only a façade for Britain’s real motivations embodied in 
advancing  British  national  interests  by  reinvigorating  a  special 
relationship2 that was purportedly becoming less special” (2003, 64).  
These authors represented a third explanatory framework and that is the realist 
school  of  thought.  Its  main  assumptions  highlight  the  importance  of  the 
international structure, the state as a unitary unit in that structure, the anarchic 
self-help  system that  requires  the  state  to  seek  its  survival  and security  and 
maximize its national interests and power relative to those of other nation states. 
2 This special relationship was forged during the First and Second World Wars and manifested 
clearly in 1940 when France collapsed and Britain’s sole hope not to loose the war was only in 
accepting the American intervention. Any attempt by Britain to reshape the world faded away as 
the British Empire crumbled and Great Britain’s relative poverty and military weakness became 
increasingly evident. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain was forced to abandon a joint military 
operation in the Middle East with France in the face of an American disapproval. By then, Britain 
learned to consult and cooperate with the United States knowing the limitations of its military 
independence (Rachman, Gideon 2001, 8).   
10
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Will this school of thought be the most appropriate explanatory theory for my 
case? That  is  what I  will  test  in the fourth chapter  through reading different 
scholars that adopted the realist theory in explaining the case study.
In  the  final  chapter,  I  shall  try  to  give  appropriate  explanation  to  prove my 
hypothesis  and  consequently  answer  the  questions  which  I  proposed  in  this 
context. It is also expected, through looking at excerpts from Blair’s speeches and 
actions throughout the war, that I will be able to judge for myself as well as for 
the reader, in the context of the Anglo-American special relationship as well as 
the peculiarity of the British political system especially under Blair’s reign, that 
Blair  used  the  teachings  of  the  pluralist  and  moralist  thought  as  a  façade- 
embodied  namely  in  using  the  ideas  of  collective  community  and  spreading 
democracy to the outer world as means of mitigating “terrorism” worldwide- for 
his  real  motivations.  By  looking  at  the  political  principles  underpinning  the 
British notion of special relationship with the USA, the research contends that 
“Blair’s involvement in the US-led war against Iraq was mainly motivated by his 
desire  to  advance  British  national  interests  through  tightening  the  historical 
Anglo-American special relationship (Azubuike 2003, 65).  
My methodological approach using the aforementioned international relations 
viewpoints to test Blair’ foreign policy decision making in the Iraq war will be 
through analyzing primary as well as secondary resources of information (books, 
articles, online journals, and speeches) related to my topic of research. 
As part of the limitations to the research, the denied access to highly classified 
governmental  documents  prevented  me  from  pursuing  the  complete 
information.  Not  only  that,  but  the  limitation  of  resources  has  added  to  my 
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difficulties as a researcher. In fact, I have been faced during my research with 
lack of references and resources that are relevant to my topic. Since the Iraq war 
2003 is considered to be a relatively new event in the international arena, all I 
could find in our libraries was only survey  of the Iraq war events with little bit 
of reflections, mostly non-academic. Therefore, I had to leave for the UK on my 
own expenses,  visit  both Manchester  and Newcastle  universities  to  collect  as 
much academic papers as possible. I had also to borrow an Athens password 
from a friend studying at Westminster University in London to be able to open 
up the electronic journals (which otherwise would be extremely expensive) that 
might be of relevance. 
Despite  these  limitations  that  greatly  constrained me to  an extent  that  I  was 
willing  to  change the  whole  topic,  I  am  pleased to  present  this  thesis  that  I 
believe might be the first study to tackle Blair’s foreign policy decision making 
analytically. Although studies attempted to depict his behaviour, they only gave 
mere description to that decision or an insinuation to how it can be explained, as 
the  maximum.  However,  throughout  my  study,  I  tried  to  test  his  behaviour 
against  three  international  relations  perspectives  in  order  to  arrive  at  a 
reasonable explanation that enables us to 1. Understand the discrepancy between 
Blair’s rhetoric existent in his New Labourist line of thought that he attempted to 
exploit in justifying the war against Iraq and his real political course of action; 
and 2. Highlight the real reasons behind Blair’s decision to go to war. 
Throughout the thesis, emphasis was given to Tony Blair as a leader, the Prime 
Minister of Britain who made a decision to go to war in the name of his country. 
Based on the realist tradition which I expect to be the most appropriate theory to 
12
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explain my hypothesis, the unitary and rational state is represented by one voice 
and that is its leader. No matter differences of view among political figures or 
bureaucracies within the states there are, they are ultimately resolved so that the 
state speaks by one voice, (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 55). Therefore, references to 
Blair  as  a  leader  and Britain as  a  state  are employed interchangeably for  the 
purpose understanding Blair’s foreign policy decision of going to the Iraqi war. 
According to Machiavelli, politicians and statesmen find meaning in the state, 
even though they may not have created it. They subordinate personal interests to 
its interests; they dedicate their lives to its preservation and pursuit of power. 
They  do  what  is  necessary  to  ensure  its  survival  and prosperity,  (Viotti  and 
Kauppi 1999, 59). The Prince is responsible for the wellbeing of his state, of it 
security  and  survival.  The  survival  of  Britain,  as  a  unit  in  the  international 
system, is identified with and dependant on the ruling prince, in our case here, 
Tony Blair.  
Leaders  such  as  Tony  Blair  fashion  the  international  order  through  their 
diplomacy and foreign policy decisions (Kissinger1994, 27).  In fact,  they build 
international systems, while researchers attempt to analyze their operations and 
mechanisms. As an analyst, I tried to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision of 
joining  for  war  and the  reasons  behind it  through looking  into  the  ways  he 
managed and assessed the “problem: going to war” under certain circumstances; 
most importantly of which is the constraining surrounding international system 
and Britain’s place within it; both of which dictated Blair’s decision. According to 
Waltz,  “the  best  way  to  understand  human  behavior  is  to  understand  it  as 
conditioned by society; we are products of a social environment. The same holds 
true for international relations”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 135).     
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2. British Foreign Policy under Blair
2.1 The Emergence of New Labour 
Since achieving power in 1997, New Labour has been extensively making claims 
about concepts of multilaterism, internationalism, interdependence, and morality 
existent in its foreign policies and wanting to be a ‘force for good in the world’. 
However, the Iraq crisis has proved that there is real gap between Blair’s policy 
claims and the reality of such policy on the ground.   
This chapter will focus on the puzzle of my research whereby I shall present the 
development of the Blairite New Labour. The foreign policy decision made by 
Blair  to  invade  Iraq  is  expected  to  be  reflective  of  and  emanating  from  the 
framing premises of his New Labour. However, to the contrary, Blair by joining 
the unilateral US-led war against Iraq has retreated from the principles that were 
shaping  the  emerging  New  Labour  to  fall  within  what  Coates  and  Krieger 
labelled  as  “New  Labour  defiant  internationalism”  that  has  traditional  state-
centric foreign policy instincts of power capabilities and interests in which British 
foreign policy should be rewritten to meet the security threats of the post9/11 
order, domestic preferences should give way to war on “terrorism” and should 
be subordinated to the UK-US alliance. In this context, Blair’s Britain is acting as 
the dependable ally to the US hegemonic power, benefiting Western corporations 
particularly  oil  companies  and  maximizing  Britain’s  independent  political 
standing in the world to remain, if not great , at least, a middle power. This New 
Labour has proved throughout the Iraq crisis that both domestic preferences and 
international institutions are irrelevant when it  comes to the nation’s survival 
and interests.     
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In  an attempt to  explain the  gap between Blair’s  New Labour  discourse and 
actual action on the ground in our case here,  I  shall  first present Blair’s  New 
Labour foreign policy supported by excerpts from speeches made by Blair on 
different occasions. Then I argue that Blair’s New Labour foreign policy dialogue 
is  only a veil  for  his actual  action regarding the Iraq crisis  especially that  he 
decided to go to the war despite the 1. Lack of a Second UN resolution; and 2. 
Opposition at the domestic level, mainly his party and the public opinion which 
opposed the war especially without a clear UN Resolution.  3. He also exploited 
the  pretexts  for  attack-  based  on  eradicating  terrorism,  regime  change  of  a 
dictatorship, proliferations of Weapons of Mass Destruction threatening world 
peace  and  stability  and  intervention  for  humanitarian  necessities  -as  tools 
supported by the government’s two intelligence reports and the legal advice of 
Lord Goldsmith to make opposing voices of both Blair’s party and nation believe 
that his course of action is the ‘right thing to do’.   
Prior analyzing this gap, an overview of Blair’s New Labour would be helpful. A 
summary of his course of action will be followed to show the contrast between 
policy and actual performance. 
2.1.1 Blair’s New Labour Policy
New Labour came into force in May 1997 determined to transform UK’s foreign 
policy completely from the classical traditional foreign policy of the past. Blair’s 
New Labour rhetoric involved two dimensions that were used extensively by 
Blair  speeches  in  justifying  the  war  against  Iraq:   internationalism  and 
interdependence.  These  two  notions,  as  he  believes,  should  be  the  basis  for 
dealing  with  world  problems  through  multilateral  rather  than  unilateral 
channels. These two pillars were combined with a sense of principle that guides 
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the Labour party to be a force for good in the world where narrow relapolitik 
interests are inferior to global concerns such as human rights and world security 
(Coates and Krieger 2004, 11-12). 
In their book,  Blair’s Wars, Coates and Krieger run through these ideas of the 
New Labour elaborately. They define internationalism as the desire to transcend 
national  boundaries  to find solutions to international  issues through a  strong 
international community and the willingness to take a multilateral rather than a 
purely state-centric approach to those issues through international institutions and 
bodies such as the UN”, (2004, 13). Through the framework of internationalism, 
Blair’s New Labour believed in the interdependence3 of both sides of the Atlantic: 
EU and US in order “to change the world, to reorder it and spread prosperity, 
democracy  and  freedom  through  peaceful  means,  through  collaboration  and 
multilaterism rather than through confrontation”, (Coates and Krieger 2004, 13). 
Thus, in order for Britain to play a pivotal role in maintaining a safer more decent 
international order, it should be stronger on both sides rather choose between 
Europe and the US.    
Sensitivity to public was also another major factor that characterized Blair’s New 
Labour.   Some commentators  such as  Driver  and Martell  described the  New 
Labour as “a Post Thatcherism tradition; where it is both attracted and repulsed 
by it. New Labour is repelled by the individualistic message of Thatcherism and 
loss of touch with people. In fact, New Labour offered greater popular sensitivity 
3 Keohane and Nye(1977) in their article: “Realism and Complex Interdependence” identified three 
characteristics of interdependence:
1. Multiple Channels connecting societies including formal and informal ties;
2. The agenda of relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a 
consistent hierarchy’
3. Military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the 
region. 
Source: Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 1979. Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition. Boston: Brown.      
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in politics and concern for the many not  just  the few”, (1998,  3).   Even Blair 
himself highlighted the inclusion of the public in the decision making process in 
his Labour Party Speech in 19974 where he believed that grass root people have 
the power to change the course of the nation’s politics. Their will,  needs, and 
desires are to be respected in order to win their trust.  As Blair puts it,  “New 
Labour is the political arm of none other than the British people as a whole. Our 
values are the same: the equal worth of all, with no one cast aside; fairness and 
justice  within strong communities”.  According to  Driver  and Martell,  “Blair’s 
populist appeal to Labour’s values and conception of national identity as those of 
the people is part of this process of re-identifying with voters and making the 
party electable”,(2002,  150).  It  is  also compatible with the principle of ‘let  the 
people decide’ that has been reflected in the growth of referenda which are used 
to measure the public mood to certain government decisions; joining the Euro 
currency decision would be a perfect example. In fact, Jones and Kavanagh state 
that referenda and opinion polling were highly used by Blair as indicators of the 
public mood to redress the citizens’ concerns (2003).
Blair,  since  taking  over  in  1997,  has  been  exemplifying  with  great  sense  of 
pragmatism what Almond and Verba described in their book, The Civic Culture, 
about  the  style  in  which  politics  is  conducted  whereby  values  of  citizen 
participation are balanced against a trust in the elites and a responsiveness to 
their  laws;  a  policy that  is  neither  totally right  nor left  but  some way in the 
middle which Blair calls ‘Third Way’. This comes in total agreement with what 
Beetham  states  that  public  expression  of  opinion  either  through  election  or 
protest  acts  as  a continuous discipline on the  elected,  requiring them to give 
4 Blair, Tony. 1997. Prime Minister’s Speech following Labour’s Victory in 1997. Available at: 
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8073.asp.(Accessed on 20 August 2005).
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public account of their actions and to take constant notice of public opinion”, (as 
quoted in Judge 2004, 685).    
2.1.2 Third Way Labourism 
“This ‘Third Way’ has been developed as a political guide that shifted the British 
foreign policy from at least five angles” (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 848):
• “Projecting a different identity for Britain”: As opposed to Thatcherism 
foreign policy of the imperial power, the New Labour’s Third way of the 
British identity projected a more forward looking image of Britain on the 
international stage which is not based on the imperial past or the military 
strength. But rather on the values of ‘inclusive society’ in which people 
would be proud of  their  counties  for  its  pluralist  values which allow 
them to hold their leaders accountable for their actions. 
• “A  new  language  of  International  Relations”:  A  concept  such  as 
internationalism was  formulated  in  the  Third  Way  teachings  in  which 
world issues mattered to all; hence, they should be looked at from an 
international  multilateral  perspective  rather  unilaterally  in  terms  of 
narrow RealPolitik interest.
• “The ethical  dimension”:  Britain should be a good force in the world 
where human rights all over the world would be respected. It should also 
be committed to economic, social and political development worldwide. 
Blair’s  doctrine  of  humanitarian intervention was introduced within the 
framework of an interdependent, multilateral world which Blair believed 
in to advance human rights, security and safety worldwide.  
• “The vision of good international citizenship”:  Inclusive of the former 
point, this image also entails the concern for the internationalist agenda 
on global  challenges.  The good international  citizenship must act as a 
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moderator  for  the  struggle  for  power  by  strengthening the  rules  and 
norms of international order. It seeks to tame the element of brute power 
and looks to the recognition of order and justice in world politics. Being a 
permanent member of the UNSC, leader of the Commonwealth and a 
major player in the EU will help Britain further the principles of good 
citizenship  in  a  diplomatic  manner  backed  by  military  action  only if 
legitimized by the UN.   
These  teachings  were  reflected  by  Blair  on  numerous  occasions  mainly  the 
1999speech where he highlighted his Doctrine of the International Community at 
the  Economic  Club  in  Chicago.  This  doctrine  was  socialist  as  he  explained, 
“socialism…is a moral purpose for life, a set of values, and a belief in society, in 
cooperation… it is how I try to live my life…I am worth no more than any other 
man…this is my socialism…let us {then} rouse ourselves to a new moral purpose 
for  our  nation.  In  the  speech,  he  highlighted  the  need  for  new  rules  for 
international cooperation as a consequence of an ever increasing interdependent 
world.  The  doctrine  of  isolationism  cannot  be  applicable  in  a  world  of 
globalization;  rather a doctrine of ‘international  community’  should become a 
natural alternative as Blair suggests. He explains that “being dependent on each 
other, just as within domestic politics, the notion of community-the belief that 
partnership and cooperation are essential to advance self-interest- is coming into 
its own. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and 
disarmament issues; none of these can be solved without intense international 
cooperation: {Here he suggests close EU-US cooperation to achieve this end}” 
(1999).  Blair  even  introduced  in  this  speech  the  principle  of  humanitarian 
intervention as a tool to spread the values of liberty, rule of law, human rights 
and democracy.  The Westphalian principle  of  non-interference  should  not  be 
overruled  except  in  cases  of  acts  of  Genocide  and/  or  oppression.  Blair 
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highlighted  5  tests  of  when  warlike  humanitarian  intervention  must  be 
applicable (1999):
• Are we sure of the case?
• Have we exhausted all diplomatic means?
• Based on practical assessment, are there military operations we 
can sensibly and prudently undertake?
• Are we prepared for the long term?
• Do we have national interest at stake?
As we can see here, Blair’s speech mirrored many aspects of his ‘Third Way’ 
Labourism of internationalism, interdependence, and humanitarianism that were 
also touched upon in his 9/11 speech as well as his address to the nation prior 
the Iraq war. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Blair highlighted his ethical 
interventionist  doctrine  as  part  of  a  British  global  foreign  policy  that  would 
ensure peace and security and protect human rights. He stated: “the starving, the 
wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from 
the  deserts  of  north  Africa  to  the  slums  of  Gaza,  to  the  mountain  ranges  of 
Afghanistan: they too are our cause. This is a moment to seize... the pieces are in 
flux, soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder the world around 
us”,  (2001).  In  his  address  to  the  Nation  in  20  March  2003,  Blair  used these 
principles extensively to prove to both his nation and party that taking part in 
military action in Iraq alongside the US is the right thing to do that comes with 
Britain’s  national  interest.  He  explained  that  the  world  faces  a  new  global 
security problem that necessitates the use of international community to face this 
“new threat of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed 
with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our 
way  of  life,  our  freedom  and  democracy”  (2003).  In  this  speech,  Blair  also 
emphasized the ethical side of the military action against Iraq embodied mainly 
in  the  humanitarian effort.  He added,  “Our commitment  to  the  post-Saddam 
humanitarian effort will be total. We shall help Iraq move towards democracy… 
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Removing Saddam will be a blessing to the Iraqi people. Four million Iraqis are 
in exile. 60% of the population are dependent on food aid. Thousands of children 
die every year through malnutrition and disease. Hundreds of thousands have 
been driven from their homes and murdered”, (2003). Blair also accentuated that 
this military action against Iraq is in the framework of preserving world peace, 
order and stability that dictators like Saddam Hussein threaten to undermine; 
therefore Britain, under New Labour, should secure the respect for both world 
peace  and  human  rights  worldwide  through  cooperating  with  the 
interdependent world of modern states hinting at both the EU and the US.
Blair believes that cooperation between those sides of the Atlantic is necessary to 
materialize his doctrine of international community especially in the war against 
terrorism.  According  to  Stephens,  Blair,  just  like  previous  British  Prime 
Ministers,  believe  in  the  indispensability  of  the  special  relationship  with  the 
United  States  as  the  nexus  of  historical,  cultural,  economic  and  security  ties 
alongside a shared language (2004, 104). But what differentiates Blair from his 
predecessors is his belief of the necessity to balance such strong Atlanticism with 
a  deep  commitment  to  Europe  within  the  framework  of  the  values  of 
international  community  and  interdependence  previously  mentioned.  As  a 
leader, Blair believed that Britain should be a leading member of the EU, shaping 
it to become more outward-looking and effective. But at the same time Britain 
should be a loyal partner of the US, showing it that multilateralism and working 
with allies pay.  Blair  is  not  the first  prime minister to talk about Britain as  a 
“bridge” between the US and Europe, but he has emphasised it more than most, 
and argues that Britain must avoid having to choose between its European and 
Atlanticist  relationships.  According to Blair,  “It  is  absurd to imaging that for, 
Britain;  there is  a  choice between the relationship with Europe and that  with 
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America. On the contrary, the real value to the US of the British role in Europe 
lies in the influence we can still and will exert to keep Europe firmly linked to the 
US in defence, outward looking and open to trade and investment”, (as quoted in 
Riddell 2003, 71).  
Coates  and  Krieger  argue  that  the  aforementioned  Blairite  New  Labour 
principles stem from the socialist tradition of the British Labourism. According to 
Blair in a lecture at the commemoration organized by the Fabian Society to mark 
the 15th anniversary of the 1954 General Election in year 1995  : 
“Socialism  is  based  on  a  moral  assertion  that  individuals  are 
interdependent,  that  they  owe  duties  to  one  another  as  well  as 
themselves, and that common humanity demands that everyone be given 
a platform on which to stand. It  has objective basis  too,  rooted in the 
belief  that  only  by  recognizing  their  interdependence  will  individuals 
flourish,  because  the  good  of  each  depends  on  the  good  for  all.  This 
concept requires a form of politics in which we share responsibility to 
fight poverty, prejudice, unemployment (in our case ‘terrorism’ would be 
included) “, (as quoted in Coates and Krieger 2004, 108).    
This definition captures the central themes of Blair’s New Labour policy in which 
both domestic and foreign policies are connected by a set of principles mainly: 
interdependence rather than conflict; commonality of values and aims defined in 
terms of community or humanity and the responsibility of individual citizens 
towards  each  other.  British  foreign  policy  involves  clear  ethical  principles,  a 
commitment to third force neutralism and building of multilateral institutions 
that  should  act  as  counterweight  to  pure  national  interests  emphasized  in 
traditional Labour foreign policy.  These values, as Blair argues, should not only 
result in respect for his government abroad but would command more support at 
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home, and a government strong at home, in turn, would have a louder voice 
abroad. Coates and Krieger further argue that Blair’s New Labour’s notion of 
community,  just  as  within domestic  politics,  cuts  its  way in foreign policy in 
which the belief of partnership, multilateralism, and cooperation in the economic, 
environmental and security dimensions of foreign affairs is necessary to secure 
human rights worldwide”, (2004, 110). 
To  sum  up,  Blair’s  Chicago  speech  outlined  the  most  important  guiding 
principles for British foreign and domestic policies. He believed that the forces of 
globalization necessitates global interdependence among countries in which the 
notion of international community, collaboration and the institutions that deliver 
them obliges those countries not to retreat to isolationism but interventionism- 
when necessary  through war  -  in  order  to  establish humanitarian policy and 
spread the pluralist values of human rights, democracy, liberty and security.     
2.1.3 Blair’s Political Action in the Iraq War 2003
Now coming to the case of the Iraq war, Blair has stood shoulder to shoulder 
with  the  United  States.  In  doing  so,  however,  a  divergence  between  the 
previously presented policy and his actual decision making has emerged starkly. 
Prior attempting to suggest realism, rather than pluralism or idealism, as a school 
of thought capable of resolving this paradox, an overview of Blair’s behaviour in 
the war will be presented below.      
2.2 The Divergence between Policy and Politics
2.2.1 Multilateralism and Internationalism
In the preparations to the Iraq war, “Blair played a multilateralist expressing his 
commitment to the international institution of the UN; however, he would often 
say  that  this  commitment  was  conditional  and  could  not  be  an  excuse  of 
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inaction” (Stephens 2004, 208). In fact, this has the insinuation that the war would 
be inevitable  despite  the lack of  international  legitimacy necessary for  Blair’s 
interventionism presented in his New Labour policy as mentioned above. Even 
the tests put by Blair to justify what he calls ‘’humanitarian intervention’’ were 
not totally met. For example, Blair’s emphasis on exhausting all the diplomatic 
means prior military intervention in a certain country was overruled when Blair 
along with Bush ignored Saddam’s attempt to comply with demands of the UN 
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In fact, they 
publicly declared that “Saddam’s 12,000 page document disclosing his weapons 
programs-in a response to resolution 14415- was full of gaps and evasions, so Iraq 
could already be said to be in material breach of the UNSCR 1441 which was 
itself written in demanding ambiguous terms so that a (false) disclosure would 
be a material breach, as would be the refusal to allow key personnel in the Iraqi 
Program to be interrogated outside of Iraq”, (Freedman 2004, 29). In addition, 
Blair, along with Bush of course, was dismissive of the report submitted by Blix, 
head of the (UNMOVIC) which stated that the Iraqi cooperation concerning the 
disarmament demands was progressing well (Kramer 2003). These were seen as 
removing the principal pretexts for war. 
Blair’s insistence on the principle of international community and multilateralism 
rather unilateralism as a means for conflict resolution to world issues has been 
manipulated when Blair willingly decided to alter one multilaterist route: France, 
Germany, Russia and most non-permanent members of the Security Council that 
went against his interests (in going to war alongside the US) with another one 
that he tried to convince on his side: Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, Cameroon, Angola, 
and  Guinea.  His  failure  to  secure  a  Second  UN  Resolution  mandating  the 
5 See link for Full UNSCR on: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7630AB.doc.htm#_S/RES/1441_Iraqi_material
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military intervention did not inhibit him from joining the attack on Iraq despite 
advice from his senior government figures such as Jack Straw. On the contrary, 
he  manipulated  the  French  position  (to  veto  the  Resolution  under  any 
circumstances) for his benefit after he failed to secure a Second Resolution. Curtis 
states that “Blair’s government abandoned the attempt to secure a UN resolution 
explicitly in the face of opposition from France, Germany, Russia and most non-
permanent members of  the Security  Council.  Bribes,  sweeteners  and pressure 
were  being  used  to  bring  other  states  into  the  line  making  a  mockery  of 
multilateral cooperation. Blair even introduced a new concept to justify ignoring 
the UN- the ‘unreasonable veto’, that could be cast by other permanent members 
of the Security Council”, (2003, 10). It seems contradictory on the part of Blair to 
see him violate the international law in going to war without UN authorization 
while at the same time building the case for waging the war against Saddam on 
the basis of the latter’s breach of past UN resolutions. 
Furthermore, Blair, in his course of action, in the Iraq war, threatened to damage 
the interdependent world he spoke of in his New Labour policy as necessary to 
tighten the will of the international community in preserving world peace, order 
and protection of human rights. Blair’s behaviour with his European peers could 
hardly be understood in the framework of interdependence that tilted to the side 
of the Americans only.  All the way in trying to persuade Bush, Blair played on 
the rhetoric of the necessity of the international community’s support. He said on 
April  7,  2003 in a speech at  the Bush Presidential  Library,  “The international 
coalition matters. Where it operates, the unintended consequences of action are 
limited, the diplomatic parameters better fixed. The US and the EU together are 
preconditions of such alliances”, (as quoted in Riddell 2003, 200). However, what 
we have seen during the course of war that Blair’s main foreign policy pillar of 
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integrating both the EU and the US has been undermined for the benefit of the 
American  side.  In  the  pretext  that  “the  world’s  superpower  would  act  in  an 
unpredictable  manner  in  the  wake  of  9/11  attacks,  Blair  offered  an 
unprecedented support to Bush’s reassurances staking his own reputation among 
his European allies mainly France and Germany” (Stephens 2004, 206). This has 
resulted in shaking the European end of the transatlantic bridge which Blair has 
always  sought  to  enforce  in  attempt  to  tighten  the  values  of  international 
community  and  collective  will  (Kramer  2003).  Hill  hints  that  Blair  was  not 
concerned  about  his  European  ties  as  much  as  he  is  concerned  about  his 
American  relations.  “He  neglected  to  consult  properly  with  his  European 
partners assuming that they would come to his position in the end. In fact, the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was barely relevant to the 
day-to-day  conduct  of  Blair’s  foreign  policy  with  a  concern  for  European 
multilaterism being merely an empty phrase of New Labour rhetoric (Stephens 
2004, 95). According to Kramer, Blair wanted to commit the United Kingdom to 
Europe, a line which Blair’s New Labour has taken upon the defeat of the hard-
line Euro-sceptics Conservative party (2003). Nonetheless, the Iraq crisis proved 
that  commitment  wrong making Blair  adopt  a  more unilateralist  view of  the 
world as opposed to that multilateral view of the Europeans who refused to see 
the world simply in terms of good and evil as Blair and Bush did or assumed 
they did. Stephens further argues, “Europe believed that security was anchored 
in  the  multilateral  institutions  that  had  kept  peace  in  the  post-cold  war  era. 
However, America treated those institutions as an irrelevant relic of the past” 
(2004, 222). 
The ideological  tension  between both  sides  was  deepened when Washington 
(and later Britain) described the endorsement of a second UNSCR would be nice 
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but not necessary. The fragile transatlantic unity that followed the UNSCR 1441 
was cracking especially when France had demanded an explicit commitment to a 
second  resolution  before  any  military  action  would  be  contemplated. 
Commenting on this, Riddell states that “Blair was not concerned about either 
France’s  or  Germany’s  demands  as  much  as  he  was  about  America’s  which 
meant power, security, and survival to him. Even though Blair spent hours on 
the  phone  with  both  Chirac  and  Schroeder,  reaching  agreement  with  them 
seemed  a  lower  priority”,  (2003,  296).  Blair  even  added  fuels  to  the  fires, 
according to Riddell, by attaching his signature along with those of seven other 
European leaders- including the right wing prime ministers of Spain and Italy- to 
an article in the Wall Street Journal backing the US stance and demonstrating that 
France and Germany could not speak for Europe thus leading to the paralysis of 
the  European  Coalition  (2003,  243).  This  obviously  signifies  Blair’s  rift  with 
Europe especially the socialist-oriented countries like France and Germany which 
shared his Third Way Labourism or Newe Mitte for the benefit of his partnership 
with the US. It seems, according to Kagan, that “Blair, in divergence from his 
New Labourists, endorsed the idea of international double standard for power. 
He has tried to lead Britain in to the rule-based Kantian world of the European 
Union. But as his solidarity with President Bush on the Iraq war has shown, Blair 
wanted to lead Europe, although against its will, back to the Hobbesian world, 
where military power remains a key feature of international  relations”,  (2003, 
128-129).     
2.2.2 Blair’s Style of Leadership 
Another divergence between Blair’s policy and politics that has surfaced in the 
Iraq war is the issue of the sensitivity to the public. As it would seem in harmony 
with Blair’s Third Way New Labour, a referendum on the decision to go to Iraq 
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would follow naturally just like the referendum on UK’s possible joining of the 
Euro.  Nevertheless,  the preparations to the Iraq war have witnessed the least 
sensitivity Blair  could offer to his public which is  considered the legitimizing 
power  for  his  premiership.  As  Ramesh  argues,  “the  rift  between  the  Prime 
Minister and the British public over the war was exposed by an opinion poll, 
taken over that weekend of the famous one million public protest in the cities of 
London, which showed that a clear majority of British voters opposed a military 
attack.  Blair’s  personal  ratings had dropped through the  floor  to  -20  points”, 
(2003, 75). Throughout the year of 2003, polls like MORI’S and YouGov revealed 
more  dissatisfaction than  satisfaction  with the  government’s  especially  Blair’s 
handling  of  the  Iraq  war.  The  percentages  satisfied/  dissatisfied  with  the 
government were 24/67 and for Blair 30/63”, (Rallings and Thrasher 2004, 383). 
Despite this public outrage and its utter opposition to the US-led war against Iraq 
especially without a second UN resolution, Blair consciously decided to go to this 
war for the sake of what he described as the ‘conviction’. This conviction Blair is 
describing  relates  to  his  sense  of  international  community  obligating  him  to 
spread  the  values  of  peace,  equality,  justice  and  most  of  all  democracy. 
Nonetheless, what Blair did was that he overrode the democratic underpinning 
of the same values at home when he deliberately chose not to respond to the 
people’s will for the favour of supporting the United States. In fact, he overruled 
the  people’s  will  that  ‘democratically’  legitimizes  his  position  as  a  Prime 
Minister. Not only that, but he has been dismissive of the cabinet as an important 
collective body in decision-making process preferring to work in small group of 
individuals and advisors. 
Instead  of  being  inclusive  in  the  decision-making  process,  the  public  was 
excluded almost totally from that process- leading to the decision of attacking 
Iraq-  due to Blair’s  style  of  leadership which authors  tend to coin as  “prime 
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ministership” in which the electorate, cabinet and sometimes parliament would 
be,  to a great extent, alienated by the Prime Minister who, primarily,  lends a 
listening ear to his close aides mainly appointed by him. 
However,  it  is  customary  of  all  prime  ministers  to  appoint  like-minded 
supporters to their ‘kitchen cabinets’, and Blair was no exception. According to 
Jones  and Kavanagh,  “Blair’s  personal  imprint  is  reflected  in  his  decision  to 
import his press secretary and many others of his personal staff into Downing 
Street. His policy unit (13 staff) is the largest ever. As a result, cabinet’s influence 
declined sharply as  Blair  relied  on bilateral  meetings with ministers,  and the 
parliament became less  significant  because of  Labour’s  huge majority”,  (2003, 
182). This form of leadership through which Blair would rely on unelected aides 
to pass certain decisions that are of particular interest to him created what Jones 
and Kavanagh called a “PM’s Department that may have a unique significant 
institutional legacy in the future”, (183). Nevertheless, such tendency in policy-
making was criticized in June 2003 by a number of cabinet members in which the 
decision to go to Iraq had been made by Blair in close collaboration with his close 
advisors. According to MP Claire Short following the debate of the Iraq war, “the 
problem in the second term of the New Labour is the centralization of power into 
the hands of the Prime Minister and an increasingly small number of advisors 
who make decisions without proper discussion. It is increasingly clear that there 
is no real collective responsibility because there is no collective; just dictates in 
favour of policy issues that comes from high” (as quoted in Riddell 2003, 264). 
This  style  of  leadership  has  given  Blair  the  space  to  pursue  foreign  policy 
decision of going to war independently of the domestic internal pressure, in our 
case, the public protest of one million people marching through the streets of 
London.  Such  negligence  of  such  magnitude  contradicts  Blair’s  previous 
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emphasis that people should decide, and their leaders should be responsive to 
their  concerns in  order  to  gain their  trust.  It  seems that  Blair  was willing to 
forsake  that  trust  for  the  benefit  of  his  partnership  with  the  US.  However, 
according to Martin et al, “British national interests- whether of low policy such 
as  economic  prosperity,  pursuit  of  world  order,  promotion  of  advantageous 
values (as Blair claims) or of high policy such as military security and defence of 
homeland- should emerge from below, from the people. Any idea that they are 
imposed  from  above  and  reflect  the  interests  of  the  state  represented  in  its 
statesmen, of course, at the expense of its subject is quite alien to the democratic 
tradition  in  Britain.  Domestic  opinion  should  play  a  central  role  in  decision- 
making regarding foreign policy issues” (1992, 74).
It  might  be  said  that  decisions  to  go  to  war  constitute  part  of  the  royal 
prerogative  exercised  by  the  PM;  yet  this  does  not  justify  the  centrality  of 
decision-making in the hand of Blair and a number of his advisors to an extent 
that lead, on some case like ours, to neglecting the public. According to Judge, 
“this contradicts Blair’s New Labour’s policy that unveiled an extensive array of 
initiatives  designed to provide citizens with the opportunity to influence and 
participate in debate”, (2004, 699). 
Counterarguments  would  suggest  that  representative  government’s  such  as 
Blair’s  should  not  listen  to  such  sentimental  outbursts  expressed  by   public 
demonstrations or marches since policy-makers are more politically aware and 
knowledgeable of  what is  in the interest  of both their  country and people to 
survive in a world of chaos. However, when the following factors, according to 
Beetham (2003, 604), characterize a certain demonstration, policy makers such as 
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Blair  should  take  public  opinion  seriously  and  bypass  the  royal  duty  of 
autonomously deciding upon a war: 
• A national issue that touches the future of the entire nature;
• The mass protests involve large numbers of people for this gives weight 
to the campaign;
• The organized mobilization of opinion should be supported by a clear 
majority in opinion polls;
• The issue in subject, Iraq war for example, should have been subject to 
extensive public debate.
Not  only  did  Blair  ignore  his  nation’s  will  by  dismissing  all  these  factors 
collectively, but he also manipulated the parliament as well as his own party into 
his favourable direction, in our case, voting for war. As Norton argues, “control 
and centralization of power characterizing Blair’s leadership under New Labour 
has constrained these entities (party and parliament) to act as policy influencing 
collective bodies which can modify and sometimes reject measures put forward 
by the executive” (2000, 245). In doing this, Blair has diverged from the sense of 
collective community which he has emphasized in his Third Way Labourism: the 
community whose wills and concerns are met; the community that is strong at 
home  will  be  also  strong  abroad;  foreign  policy  cannot  be  detached  from 
domestic one; on the contrary, one is continuation for the other and goals across 
borders cannot be achieved or separated with goals at home. All these principles 
mirror the sense of collective community which Blair emphasized in his Third 
Way Labourism. However, what has been witnessed of rebellion in Blair’s party 
(and his reliance on support for the war on the Opposition Party that disagrees 
with his socialist Third Way Labourism) and misleading of the parliament to win 
a vote (through relying on false intelligence reports and the legal advice of Lord 
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Goldsmith which he manipulated) suggests that Blair’s consideration for such 
factors as party, cabinet or parliament is secondary to what he perceives as the 
interests of his country. 
According to Stephens, “121 Labour Members of Parliament (MP) voted against 
war on February 26, 2003. At the beginning of March, over 200 MP’s –more than 
half of the total-of Blair’s own party threatened to vote against the war. Although 
scarcely surviving a vote of no confidence from his MP’s, Blair ironically was 
assured he could go to war using the support of the opposition pro-war party 
whose  beliefs  and ideologies  are  at  the  extreme contrary  to  that  of  the  New 
Labourism of Blair” (2004, 234). As Hill argues, Blair’s decision to blindly support 
the United States without a UN authorization made the majority of Labour party 
members feel uneasy about the conduct of Blair’s foreign policy (prioritizing his 
relationship with the US over his commitment to the international institutions 
such as the UN and the EU, the bedrock of global  stability and the basis for 
Britain’s  convinced multilaterism (as  quoted in  Kampfner 2003);  a  fact  which 
followed  the  resignations  of  three  Ministers.  Those  oldest  and  closest  labour 
allies of Blair has abandoned him not accepting the rationale of war. In fact, this 
labour outrage and historical revolt reflects the fact that Blair used the vote of 
Parliament to secure his benefits of not risking the special relationship with the 
US while pretending at the same time that he followed the proper constitutional 
channels in decision making when handing the parliament the power to debate 
and vote as Ramesh argues, (2003, 54-55). Indeed, the speech Blair delivered to 
the Parliament was “full of arguments that the public grew wary of suspecting 
them being attenuated, circumscribed and distorted by political calculations on 
top of which the UK-US special relationship” (2003, 76). On one hand, the speech 
to the Parliament on March 18,  2003 highlighted Blair’s  ideology of collective 
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responsibility, humanitarian intervention, and world justice to rid the world of 
tyrannies and dictatorship such as Saddam’s so as to allow the Iraqi people live 
freely and safely, this was perceived by Blair as an interest for Britain. On the 
other hand, his speech to the more private setting of the parliament on March 14, 
2003, Blair said: ‘In the final analysis, disarming Iraq of WMD is necessary for the 
long-term security of the world and to the collective  interests of  our historic 
allies; therefore, it is manifestly in the national interest of this country’, (quoted 
in  Saraceni  2003,  12).  This  point  stressing  the  national  interests  is  in  striking 
contrast with the one about the improvement of the Iraqi people’s condition as 
part of Britain’s interest. 
The unclear ends embedded in Blair’s speeches “produced a large-scale revolt 
among the Labour members of Parliament. Blair’s decision to support the war 
and to engage Britain without a second UN resolution defied two strong and 
ancient  currents  in  New  Labour:  pacifism and collective  community.  It  even 
broke his promise to the parliament that Saddam’s non-compliance would not 
automatically trigger a war according to 1441: “To those who fear this resolution 
is  just  an  automatic  trigger  point,  without  any  further  discussion  point, 
paragraph 12 of the resolution makes it clear that it is not”6. The number of MP’s 
who favoured was fewer than 100 out of 659, according to Ramesh, although 
Blair  eventually  ironically  got  the  votes  he  needed from the  Opposition  side 
which offered full-throated support (2003, 99).
2.2.3 Blair’s Moral Argument 
Another  dimension in  which Blair’s  action has diverged from the  announced 
Third Way policies is his commitment to the ethical dimension of foreign policy. 
Blair has manipulatively used the argument of intervening in Iraq for moral and 
6 Tony Blair’s statement in response to the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 
November 2002.  
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humanitarian reasons as a cover for his true incentives to be discussed in the 
fourth chapter. 
To be a good citizen in the world and force for good, intervention in other states 
domestic  affairs  for  humanitarian  purposes  should  be  only  legitimized  and 
authorized by the international community of the UN. Although the term state 
sovereignty ‘where state exercises absolute power over its territory, system of 
government and population’ has been the cornerstone of international relations 
according to the Westphalian order, Dunaev states that humanitarian reasoning 
behind intervening in  other  states’  domestic  affairs  has  been  a  revolutionary 
feature in international relations inherent in the twentieth century and supported 
by the UN whose Charter speaks of ‘fundamental human rights’ ,‘dignity and 
worth  of  the  human  person’  and  the  obligation  of  states  to  uphold  certain 
standards  domestically  and  to  account  for  its  actions  to  the  international 
community(2005). The UN essentially, following its Charter, is able to legitimize 
the  intervening  in  other  countries  affairs  to  protect  any  internationally 
recognized rights that have been abused there.  
Addressing the human rights doctrine as postulated by the UN and driven by the 
sense  of  international  community  described  above,  Blair  accentuated  these 
pluralist values in his Third Way Labourism. He states, “foreign policy should 
not be defined in terms of narrow RealPolitik but one with human rights and 
development at the centre (Blair 1998). Maintaining New Labour’s role a force of 
good might  require  the  use  of  what  Coates  and Krieger  describe  as  ‘warlike 
humanitarianism’ approach in  which states  are  obliged to  take action against 
those countries which forfeited their right to sovereignty when they abuse their 
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own people. For Blair, this was the basis for the first Gulf war, Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone as well as the third Iraq war (2003, 107). 
      
However, Dunaev argues that the Iraq crisis has proved that both the US and 
Britain  have  abused  the  multilateral  agreements  of  the  United  Nations 
acknowledging the obligation of the international community to act against the 
violators,  for  instance,  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights;  a  fact 
which  made  the  infringement  of  Iraq’s  sovereignty  to  deliver  humanitarian 
salvation or human rights reinforcement only a façade protecting the underlying 
layer  of  self-interest  pursuit  (2005).  In  fact,  the  latest  military US and Britain 
campaign in Iraq exemplifies the engagement in a military armed conflict against 
the collective  will  of  the  UN Security  Council;  thus reducing the multilateral 
agreements, by which they should abide by when intervening for the purposes of 
human  rights  violations,  to  inefficient  mechanisms  incapable  of  assuring  the 
peace that they boast about spreading. Blair’s insistence on supporting Bush’s 
unilateral decision to attack Iraq puts not only the legitimacy of the humanitarian 
intervention argument into doubt but also Blair’s rhetoric about the need to act 
within the multilateral consent of the international community. Such unilateral 
decision to indulge into the war heightens the possibility that such intervention 
-claimed to be based on the protection of human rights- was mainly for pursuit of 
self-interest as would the realist school of thought suggest. Advocates of such 
school such as Morgenthau do not find any explanation for sacrifice of military 
power and financial repercussions but those of having individual interests.     
Even  if  we  attempt  to  apply  the  five  tests  Blair  has  put  for  himself  when 
intervening  in  other  states’  affairs,  we  notice  that  abiding  by  the  rules  and 
regulations of the UN with regard to humanitarian intervention was not even 
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mentioned in those considerations putting in mind that he is a believer of the 
institution of international community. Acting without the authorization of the 
UN body drifts Blair away from Article 2 of the UN Charter which says: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state.” 
Furthermore, the interest Tony Blair has spoken of in his famous Kosovo speech 
in 1999 about spreading the pluralist values of democracy, human rights, liberty, 
etc… seemed to be misleading when observing closely what had happened on 
the ground in the Iraq war. According to him, “Now our actions are guided by a 
more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the 
values we cherish. In the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and 
spread the values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and an 
open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values 
makes us safer(1999). 
However,  the  Iraq  case  proved  that  those  pluralist  values  which  Blair 
consistently mentions in his discourse were only a disguise for pure geopolitical 
interests as seen by Blair.  Critics such as Curtis suggest that even if Blair was 
truthfully loyal to those values mentioned above, he has definitely abused the 
doctrine  of  humanitarian intervention and global  democratization outlined in 
Third Way Labourism and used human rights as a cover for a more complex mix 
of motives. Joining the US in a democratization process is  really questionable 
taking into  consideration the patchy record of  democratization and liberation 
which showed support of the actual removal of democratically elected regimes 
(such in Salvador, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Argentina, etc…). 
Hence, joining an alliance with a country of a history of anti-democratic moves 
raises a big question mark on Blair’s political behavior and once again highlights 
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the contradiction existent between Blair’s discourse displaying the promotion of 
democracy and human rights as part of his Third Way Labourism and Blair’s 
actual action in the war that apparently defied those same principles. As a matter 
of  fact,  the  policy  of  supporting  elites  in  the  Gulf  and  aiding  their  internal 
repression has also been a consistent British foreign policy even under Blair’s 
reign,  (Curtis 2003,  256). Blair,  for example, has described Saudi Arabia “as a 
good  friend  in  the  international  coalition  against  terrorism”.  Despite  human 
rights abuse, suppression of opposing parties, undemocratic political structures, 
Blair  has  been  supportive  of  the  Saudi’s  ruling  family  believing  that  this 
relationship  between  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  UK  will  become  stronger  in  the 
future. Blair even believed that a patient and discreet dialogue with the Saudi 
authorities regarding human rights abuses and domestic repression is the best 
way to make progress.  Blair  has been also supportive of  the Bahraini  regime 
which was criticized by Human Rights Watch for its wide range abuse of human 
rights.  He  even  hinted  that,  although  the  Bahraini  regime is  not  perfect,  we 
should  not  write  it  off  (as  quoted  in  Curtis  2003,  259).  This  comes  in  total 
contradiction  with  what  Blair  believes  about  the  necessity  for  warlike 
humanitarianism in countries which are undemocratic and abuse human rights 
on a large scale.
Anderson also argues that this moral rectitude which Blair relied on heavily in 
the run up to the war proved to be contradictory when looking on the actual 
actions on the ground. Anderson lists a number of counter-arguments to rebut 
that  claim  of  morality  and  universal  values  as  Blair’s  main  motive  for  war 
arguing that: 1. “the apparent willingness on the side of Blair (allying with Bush) 
to engage in the killing of large numbers of wholly innocent people reduces him 
to the same moral status as Saddam for the pretence to the moral-high ground on 
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the basis that fewer deaths ensued from the invasion than allegedly would have 
from inactivity is morally unjustified; 2. How would the world be a safer place 
with the US and its allies mainly Britain using power without obtaining lawful 
authorization from the UN?”, (2003, 146). This not only refutes the claim that the 
invasion was morally right but also positions both the UK and the US in the same 
camp as  the  so  called  ‘rogue (outlaw)  states’  which makes  the  argument  for 
fighting  those  states  for  breaching  the  international  law  meaningless  as  a 
rationale for military action. 
Anderson adds in his argument that the moral justification for military argument 
used by Blair was a facade from the start. The coalition troops were provided 
amply to secure the oil fields and the Ministry of Oil while looting of hospital 
equipment and medical supplies(which the Iraqi were in urgent need of) was 
carried  out  massively;  a  fact  which  makes  the  whole  claim  suspicious  and 
questionable(2003). In fact, the prioritization of the oil resources at the expense of 
the  Iraqi  suffering  (which  Blair  committed  to  alleviate  by  invading  Iraq  and 
getting rid out of  Saddam’s rogue regime) makes the  whole  moral  argument 
deceitful.  Curtis  adds  that  the  Blair’s  government  which  now  professes  its 
commitment  to  the  human  rights  of  the  Iraqis,  has  for  the  previous  decade 
consistently rejected the overwhelming evidence about the negative impacts of 
sanctions arguing that there is no evidence that such suffering is ensued from the 
sanctions, while in fact this embargo has contributed to the death of thousands of 
Iraqis through the US and UK governments’ imposed constraints on the ‘oil-for-
food-program (2003, 30). In fact, every month, 8,000 Iraqis die as a direct result of 
the sanctions. In total, this has resulted in the death of nearly 2 million civilians in 
about  a  decade,  half  of  whom  have  been  children  according  to  The  United 
Nations  Sub-Commission  on  the  Promotion  and Protection  of  Human Rights 
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(2003, 31). However, Blair has been consistently adamant to confess that these 
sanctions are behind the Iraqi people suffering. Instead, he would argue that the 
undemocratic  regime  of  Saddam  is  the  root  cause.  Therefore,  it  should  be 
changed. If this is the line of argument, how come Blair did not believe the same 
thing  towards  Saudi  Arabia  or  Bahrain,  for  instance,  for  both  would  be 
considered evil if we followed Blair’s line of thinking? Blair’s main motivation 
behind joining the US in its attack against Iraq is his belief that the “Iraqi regime 
is evil that it is a moral duty to change it”, (Ingle 2004, 273). One would deduce 
that Blair would take a similar action against those regimes in the Gulf such as 
Saudi Arabia, but he did not. That is because Iraq represented by Saddam served 
his interests no more contrary to those Gulf regimes which still retain Britain’s 
influence in the region, continue to provide Britain with oil  limitlessly,  spend 
their  oil  incomes  on  British  arms and invest  the  revenues  in  British  banking 
(Curtis 2003, 256). Therefore, the morality justification which Blair reiterates in 
his  discourse as  his primary motivation against  Iraq seems contradictory and 
inconsistent with his Third Way Labourism.
As can be deduced from the above debate, Blair’s New Labour Policy was barely 
existent in his foreign policy decision making in the Iraq crisis. On the contrary, 
what has been presented so far has proven that there has been a wide divergence 
between  policy  and  politics  with  reference  to  our  case.  In  fact,  notions  of 
international  collaboration,  community,  multilaterism,  interdependence  and 
ethical foreign policy have been obviously contradicted by Blair’s real course of 
action when he chose to defy his nation, act out of step with his European allies, 
launch a war without the legitimate authorization of the UN, and behave within 
a double standard framework of an ethical foreign policy. How can we explain this  
divergence? Has been Blair a contradictory statesman? Why was Blair willing to gamble  
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on  his  political  support  and  leadership?  Why  has  he  threatened  to  damage  the  
transatlantic relationship between the EU and the US when he chose to ignore some of  
his socialist European allies like France and Germany who opposed the war? Why did he,  
instead, ally with right wing European leaders such as the Spanish and Italian leaders? 
How can we describe Blair’s allying with the US against Iraq in the context of Blair’s  
foreign policy? How does the Blair’s alliance to act as a partner to US global power help 
it maximize its interests? Which matters more to Blair, the support of his public or the  
interests? If Blair promotes the concept of international community, how come he did not  
insist on a second Security Council Resolution in the UN to authorize the war? Instead  
he adopted the unilateral pre-emption doctrine of Bush that ignored the international  
community and made him aside with the US hegemonic power? 
2.3 Possible Explanations
Some authors attempted to find answers to these questions so as to arrive at an 
understanding of Blair’s paradox. Among of which is Tom Bentley who argues 
that Blair’s political action in the Iraq war is a mix of evangelical concern for the 
world’s “dispossessed” and a determination to maximize Britain’s influence and 
strategic  influence  in  a  post  colonial  era.  According to  Bentley,  Blair  has  put 
himself  in a position where he took vast  political  risks  in diverging from his 
Third  Way  Labourism  for  three  reasons:  “pragmatism,  moral  conviction  and 
leverage”,  (2003,  5).  These  values,  Blair  believed,  should  be  reinforced  by 
influence. His strategy is, therefore, to offer unwavering support and loyalty to 
the US taking into consideration that it is the world’s superpower. Such support 
is driven by Blair’s sense of international community that obligates him, along 
others, to galvanize the necessary response to threats, such as posed by Saddam 
or Milosevic, in order to maintain world peace and order. Attempting to carve a 
new influential role for Britain in managing international conflict, Blair believes, 
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contrary to his most of his European peers, that Europe will  never be able to 
exercise a proper influence on the world stage unless it develops its own capacity 
for strategic and military action such as the NATO. However, if the strategy to 
construct a grand coalition against the security threats of the world and engage 
opportunistically in those parts of the world such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq for the purpose of spreading long term social justice and peace, why is that 
Blair’s government strangely quiet and not influential about what is happening 
from  human  rights  violations  in  Palestine,  for  example?  And  why  is  Blair 
negligent of how law represented by the body of the UN should be the basis of 
international relations especially in times of crisis?    
Despite all contradictions and divergences, Blair believes that Britain's interests 
in the world are best secured by a close; even unquestioning alignment with its 
bigger brother across the Atlantic that overrides all other issues (Riddell 2003). 
However, Riddell agrees with Bentley that the moral conviction constitutes part 
of Blair’s paradoxical performance especially his remarkably close relationship 
with an American president who is in so many ways his complete opposite, as 
opposed to his European colleagues (2003).  Nonetheless,  on the issue of Iraq, 
these  two  very  different  leaders  have  been  complete  souls  in  which  they 
perceived  that  launching  an  attack  against  the  “tyranny”  and  “barbarity”  of 
Saddam was the right thing to do.   
On the other hand, BBC News Online political correspondent,  Nick Assinder, 
argues, in an attempt to explain Blair’s paradox, that  Blair’s speech at Brighton in 
October 2001 addressed to the Labour believers  set  forth his  vision of a  new 
world  order  following  the  events  of  9/11.  This  order  is  based  on  his  moral 
imperatives  of  fighting  alongside  the  US  against  international  terrorism  at 
whatever cost,  whether at the domestic level or the foreign one (2001). Blair’s 
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alliance with the US in its fight against “terrorism” has also offered him a unique 
opportunity to take a leading and influential role on the world stage especially at 
forging the coalition of states opposing international terrorism. 
However,  the  anti-terrorism  argument  surfaced  as  the  main  justification  for 
military action in the Iraq case, seemed totally invalid. According to Curtis, the 
war could not be legitimized based on the unproven linkage between Saddam 
and the terrorist group of Al-Qaeda especially that the Iraqi regime was a prime 
example  of  the  kind  of  corrupt  secular  regime that  Al-Qaeda  wished  to  see 
replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist one. In fact, Al-Qaeda consistently sought 
to  protect  Saudi  Arabia  from  those  secular  national  leaders  such  as  Saddam 
(Curtis 2003, 19). Hence, it runs logically from here that if the US and the UK 
wish to fight what they claim as ‘terrorism’ then Saudi Arabia should be their 
target  which  harbors  the  fundamentalists  and  supports  them  financially 
especially the Wahhabi schools across the Middle East. Yet, the Saudis were far 
from being targeted by the US-UK alliance because, as Coates and Krieger state, 
“for decades, the Saudi royal family has been a main support in the oil fields and 
markets that are so vital to the Western democracies.  Those oil interests seem to 
prevail over terrorism concerns breeding from Islamic fundamentalism but not in 
the case of a more moderately Islamic Iraq”, (2004, 76). Therefore, it is proven 
from here that the US-UK alliance was inconsistent in its argument of fighting 
terrorism;  if  so  it  should  have  targeted  Saudi  Arabia  rather  than  Iraq. 
Nevertheless Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia, embodied a defiant regime that refused 
to be controlled by the Western hegemony especially the United States, a fact 
which exposed the US interests in the region and rendered its economic position 
as vulnerable as in the 1970’s. Hence, the argument of Iraq’s linkage to Al-Qaeda 
and world terrorism would fit normally into place especially following the 9/11 
42
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
attacks against US targets as a justifiable argument for military intervention yet 
without damaging the US-UK interests in the rest of the region. As Freedman 
adds,  “the  US-UK  alliance  exerted  so  much  effort  in  demonstrating  a  link 
between Iraq and world terrorism, which by itself in the post 9/11 atmosphere 
would  have  sufficed  as  casus  bellum;  however,  no  such  link  could  be 
proven”,(2004, 9). 
Other researchers such as Paul Skidmore, a researcher at the British think-tank, 
Demos, and also an adviser to a Minister in the Blair government, argues that 
Blair  paradoxical  political  action  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  special 
relationship which Blair seeks to strengthen especially after the events of 9/11 
that  made  him closer  to  the  Bush  Administration  and its  decisions  (October 
2004). That relationship transcends any limitations or constraints including the 
internal political dissent and the Europeans’ opposition.
In addition, Stephens agrees with Bentley and Riddell that Blair’s paradoxical 
political action on the ground is a result of mixing morality with hard-headed 
RealPolitik  (2004,  201);  a  fact  which  makes  it  difficult  sometimes  to  separate 
principle from self  interest especially in regions such as Iraq in which Britain 
cannot claim to be entirely benign for it has clear energy interests in the Gulf 
region as well as a complicated historical role of maintaining influence. Yet, as 
Stephens further argues, Blair insists that his hard-edged action in Iraq results 
from his moral impulse “to be a force for good in the world” whereby Britain 
should  adopt  preventive  military  interventions  overseas  (warlike 
humanitarianism) in which Britain must not wait for crises to develop but be 
ready to take the leadership preemptively like in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
at any possible rate to maintain world order and peace (2004, 247).    
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John Kampfner, on the other hand, believes that the Iraq war is a series of four 
preceding wars throughout six years in which Blair’s motivation for launching it 
alongside the United States was a combination of Atlanticism, evangelism, and 
idealism pursued when necessary through murky means and justifications(2004, 
387). Such justifications included Blair’s insistence on Iraq’s linkage to terrorism, 
the moral necessity to alter Saddam’s regime that incurs human rights violation 
and Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction; all of which failed to be 
valid  arguments  as  have  been  argued  above.  Even  the  argument  of  WMD 
proliferation proved to be a total manipulation to win the support of both the 
party  and  nation.  According  to  Zankaneh,   the  argument  of  biological  and 
chemical weapons of mass destruction proved to be as weak as a spider’s web 
which pushed Blair later on to retreat to a position less affirmative saying that 
Iraq  may  not  necessarily  possess  WMD  but  certainly  has  the  capability  to 
produce  them”,  (2005).  The  reliance  on  the  intelligence  dossiers  of  both 
September 2002 and February 2003 proved to have stretched the truth by saying 
that Iraq is an immediate threat; for the war demonstrated clearly that Iraq does 
not possess any of those weapons claimed by the US-UK alliance. 
Nonetheless, Blair, as Naughtie states, had to establish such an ‘imminent threat’ 
in those intelligence dossiers in order to persuade his party to take a path that 
might lead to war, (2004, 139).  In fact,  he had turned dangerous possibilities 
emanating from Iraq’s capabilities into seemingly clear realities. Although it was 
not publicly known prior to the invasion (it certainly became quickly known after 
the attack), it is clear now after the war that both Bush and Blair had grossly 
manipulated their resources of intelligence about the WMD in the run up to that 
war, argue Coates and Krieger (2004, 80).  Their main line of defense was that 
doubters should have a little patience for WMD do exist in Iraq and they will 
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eventually be found by the coalition forces. However, Robin Cook responds to 
this “wait and see” policy in a twofold manner:  “1. this policy shows double 
standards on the side of Blair (and Bush) who failed to show that patience with 
Hans  Blix  when  he  demanded  more  time  for  inspection;  and  2.  if  there  is 
certainty that these WMD do exist in Iraq, how come the UK government shared 
the US administration its reluctance on allowing UN inspectors back to Iraq”, 
(Independent 2003).
Relating to the same subject matter, a BBC program titled ‘Panorama’ stated that 
PM Blair had actually manipulated the intelligence dossiers leading to the war. 
According to the program, “Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of the MI6 (a British 
Intelligence  apparatus)  briefed  Blair  on  July  23,  2002  that  the  quality  of 
intelligence sourcing for some claims made in the run-up to the publication of the 
intelligence dossier was developmental and unproven. Nevertheless, Blair told 
MPs  two  weeks  later  that  the  intelligence  picture  is  extensive,  detailed  and 
authoritative”,(2005).   
Blair’s  unjustified justifications  such as  the  previous  one prove the  fact  what 
Kampfner suggests about understanding Blair’s  paradoxical  political  action in 
the Iraq war. Those mentioned justifications were only means exploited by Blair 
to cover his real nationalistic incentives represented in his 1997 Bridgewater Hall 
speech in which he publicly said: “I am a British patriot and I am proud to be a 
British patriot. I love my country. I will always put the interests of my country 
first. The Britain in my vision . . . is a Britain confident of its place in the world, 
sure of  itself,  able to negotiate  with the world and provide leadership in the 
world”, (as quoted in Parmar 2005, 226). 
2.3.1 International Relations Perspectives
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What have been surveyed earlier about the possible understandings of Blair’s 
paradoxical  behavior  in  the  Iraq  war  can  be  interpreted  from  different 
international relations perspectives. Through screening various IR schools, I have 
chosen three namely the normative point of view, pluralism and realism. One 
reason behind that choice is suggested by a first analysis of the British politics 
which incorporates elements of morality and idealism; respect of international 
organizations;  inseparability  of  both  foreign  and  domestic  politics; 
responsiveness and accountability to the public and parliament; and above all the 
reassertion of Britain’s national interests. To understand those elements, which at 
some point  appeared contradictory to  me as  a  researcher,  I  resorted to  three 
different  IR  frameworks  to  try  comprehending Blair’s  foreign policy decision 
emanating naturally from that version of British foreign policy molded by Blair 
in  1997.  Another  reason for  choosing  those  theories  especially  pluralism and 
realism  is  that  they  are  two  prominent  schools  of  thoughts  in  International 
Relations. Both are seen as images that contain assumptions about world politics 
concerning  critical  actors,  issues  and  processes  in  world  politics.  These  two 
schools have been used extensively by analysts to address the puzzle of war in an 
attempt to build a causal pattern that leads them to a better understanding for 
waging a war. 
The  normative  viewpoint,  on  other  hand,  was  chosen  to  explain  the  moral 
argument present recurrently in Blair’s discourse especially when lobbying for 
offensive  initiatives  just  like  in  Kosovo,  Iraq,  Sudan,  Afghanistan,  Indonesia, 
etc…
However, through applying the assumptions of the three IR schools on the case 
mentioned, I proved, through the following analysis, that neither the normative 
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theory nor the pluralist school of thought could explain fully Blair’s decision to 
go to war and unravel the seemingly paradoxical behavior. On the other hand, 
the realist school of thought was perceived as superior to the other two in the 
sense that it was capable of grasping all the particularities of Blair’s decision and 
the reason(s) behind it.  In a sense, it  managed to explain what the other two 
schools failed to unravel.                                                          
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2.3.1.1 Normative Point of View
The  first  among  those  perspectives  is  a  normative  point  of  view or  value 
consideration of foreign policy choices in which the rational model for foreign 
policy  decision  is  not  driven  by  pure  power  maximization  but  by  a  value 
approach  whereby  certain  values  are  pursued,  defined  and  implemented  by 
statesmen to achieve the goals and interests of a wider community. Such ideas 
are reflected mainly in the works of Immanuel Kant and E.H. Carr.  who believe 
that  it  is  incorrect  to  view  maximization  of  power  and  interests  (the  more 
important  considerations  in  the  realist  tradition)  and  values  as  if  they  were 
mutually exclusive approaches. As E. H. Carr noted: “The utopian who dreams 
that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political 
system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes 
that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is self-seeking”, (as quoted 
in  Viotti  and Kauppi 1999,  423).  As has  been demonstrated by some authors 
above, Blair’s foreign policy particularly in the Iraq war has shown that Blair’s 
insistence  on  using  power  against  Iraq  is  necessarily  emanating  from  that 
conviction of his that human rights, world order and peace should be preserved 
at all costs even if it requires ‘warlike’ actions. 
Kant in his Perpetual Peace agrees with Carr arguing that politics and morality can 
be united in the world of international relations. “I can easily conceive of a moral 
politician;  i.e.  one who so chooses political principles  that  are consistent  with 
those of morality” (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 417). This reflects Blair’s 
announced foreign policy particularly when dealing with world issues. For him, 
“terrorism”, “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, “violation of human 
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rights” are worldwide concerns which should be tackled from an ethical point 
from view rather from limited interest-based motivations. 
However,  Blair’s  action during the  Iraq  war,  and as  discussed earlier,  shows 
clearly that, in opposition to Kant hypothesis, he is a “political moralist; one who 
forges morality in such a way that it conforms to his advantage”, (as quoted in 
Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 417). Blair has given the priority to the power of interests 
(represented mainly in his  alliance with the United States)  over morality and 
ethics which he exploited fully in his discourse to rally the public support on his 
side and win the parliamentary vote to go to war. It seems that Blair’s jumping 
on various pretexts for attacking Iraq, as mentioned previously in the text, cannot 
be  explained  from  a  moralist  point  of  view.  He  had  to  exploit  ideas  and 
principles as tools to sell the war on Iraq as the right thing to do. In fact, the 
inconsistency in seizing upon different justifications proved that Blair considered 
his population,  party,  parliament and EU allies as hurdles to be overcome in 
order  to  achieve  his  objectives,  instead  of  including  them  as  active  actors 
involved in the decision-making process.           
2.3.1.2 Pluralist Perspective 
This also suggests that Blair’s foreign policy decision making cannot be explained 
from a pluralist point of view (as would some of the previously mentioned authors 
suggest) in which its main pillars emphasize the role of international institutions 
in solving world problems, believe in the multiplicity of actors involved in the 
decision-making process, consider that state interests are not only limited to its 
security-related  benefits  but  extends  to  social,  economic  and  environmental 
issues and  emphasize the positive role played by public opinion in providing 
guidance to state officials and producing good public policy including foreign 
policy (Viotti and Kauppi  1999, 199-200). According to Moravscsik, “the state-
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society relations – the relations of states to the domestic and trans-national social 
context  in  which  they  are  embedded-  have  a  fundamental  impact  on  state 
behaviour  in  world  politics”,  (1997,  513).  Moravscsik  further  elaborates  that 
“societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping 
the state’s preferences, that is the fundamental social purposes underlying the 
strategic calculations of governments”, (513). This is in line with Robert Putnam’s 
argument which accentuates the importance of the domestic factors in shaping 
foreign policy. As mentioned above, this line of though was present in Blair’s 
foreign policy through which he described that foreign policy as an extension of 
and continuation for  domestic  politics.  According  to  Putnam,  ,  “international 
causes  –such  as  waging  war  against  another  country-might  have  negative 
repercussions on the domestic  audiences which perceive this as an adversary 
rather  than  an  ally”,  (1988,  456).  This  might  be  verbalized  in  terms  of 
demonstrations and public protests in attempt by the people to influence their 
governments’  decisions.  Here,  Putnam  labels  the  domestic  outcomes  as  non-
exogenous  from  the  international  sphere.  However,  some  leaders  choose  to 
pursue their  conceptions  of  the  national  interests  in  the  international  context 
regardless of the domestic pressure. Putnam argues that this might be damaging 
to the leader’s political life had he purposely ignored the political will  of  the 
public.  So  what  he  believes  is  “a  two-level  game  which  recognizes  the 
inevitability of domestic conflict about the national interest in a certain foreign 
policy  issue”,  (1988,  460).  Nonetheless,  in  our  case  here,  both  domestic  and 
international politics for Blair were a struggle for power, modified only by the 
different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in 
the international spheres as would the Morgenthau, the classical realist suggest, 
(1985, 39). Blair has intentionally defied the public will prioritizing the national 
interests, as he perceive them of course, over his political life that is legitimately 
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dependent on the public voice. Although gambling over his political leadership, 
Blair relied on the parliamentary vote of which he was sure of winning especially 
that the Conservative Parliament members were, to the irony, totally behind his 
back. Therefore, neither the public opinion nor his cabinet members particularly 
those Labour members were of any concern to him. Blair use of a structure of 
arguments some of which turned to be controversial following the war is a proof 
of that.  He shifted inconsistently from the linkage of Saddam’s regime to Al-
Qaeda group then his possession of WMD that could be a security to the entire 
world.  On some other cases,  he would deploy the moral responsibility of the 
coalition which should get rid of Saddam as a dictator of his own country and 
people.  According  to  Goldstein  and  Keohane,  “such  ideas,  world  views, 
principled  beliefs  and  causal  beliefs  influence  policy  when  the  principled  or 
causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actor’s clarity about 
goals or end means relationships”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 297). 
However, Blair has only used those ideas as hooks  to propagate and legitimize 
his  elitist  interests,  but  the ideas themselves do not  play a  casual  role  in  his 
foreign policy. According to Azubuike,  Blair was only using them as tools to 
commit himself  to  a war of  which interests  are its  sole end,  the dearest  of 
which is his relationship with the United States (2003, 77).        
In addition,  Blair’s  political  action throughout the Iraqi  war had left  gapping 
wounds in the international institutions as well as the European multilaterism 
which he himself had earlier nurtured in his New Labour rhetoric. Risking the 
trust  of  both  his  party  and  people  indicates  that  Blair’s  decision  cannot  be 
understood in the framework of  the Pluralist  school  of thought.  International 
institutions such as the UN were meant only to support the American will in its 
war against ‘terrorism’ as his discourse would indicate on a number of cases. UN 
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should reform its structure so as to meet the American global agenda in fighting 
terrorism  and  promoting  democracy;  such  words  were  used  as  beliefs  and 
convictions displaying an embedded morality to cover up for Blair’s alliance with 
the US for a cause that his public, European allies and party deemed unilateral 
and  unnecessary.  Blair’s  style  of  leadership  centralized  in  a  few  aides 
surrounding him paved the way for the decision to go to war;  that decision-
making  process  was  overtly  pluralist  involving  the  party  and  parliament; 
however, the process was purely unitary in the hands of Blair and his closest 
colleagues who underestimated the weight of the parliament by resorting to it 
lastly following the failure of guaranteeing a second UN resolution and hiding 
sensitive war-related information from it(such as Lord Goldsmith’s legal advice 
which Blair purposefully concealed from exposure to MP’s  at the excuse that 
they  were  not  trustworthy).  According  to  Lord  Butler,  “Blair’s  government 
reaches conclusions in rather  small  groups of  people who are not  necessarily 
representative  of  all  the  groups  of  interests  in  government,  and  there  is 
insufficient opportunity for people to debate dissent and modify decisions“, (as 
quoted in Wintour 2004). This cannot be explained from a pluralist tradition that 
accentuates  the  multiplicity  of  actors,  interests  groups,  public,  etc…  in 
formulating  the  decision-making  process.  Indeed,  this  style  of  leadership 
emphasizes  that  decisions  are  only  rationally  made  by  the  statesmen  who 
prioritize national interests over domestic interests. For Blair, the US-UK alliance 
was untouchable even if it caused him risky domestic troubles.      
Blair’s disrespect for institutions reflected also at home when he manipulated the 
legal advice of Lord Goldsmith so as to serve his interests in allying with the US; 
again the institution was only a by-product that reflected pure interests without 
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altering the behaviour of an already set mind of Blair who was then focusing 
solely on keeping the US-UK relationship as close as ever. 
In fact, the published advice shows that the attorney general told Tony Blair on 7 
March 2003 a second UN resolution was the safest legal course. Ten days later 
Lord Goldsmith's final advice was published, but included no concerns about the 
legality of the war. In this document, Goldsmith found a legal way-out of the 
use-of force dilemma when he altered his own words saying that Authority to 
use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of Resolutions 6787, 6878 
and 1441. Following that, the war started on 20 March 2003.  In the earlier advice, 
however; Lord Goldsmith raised possible legal arguments which could be made 
against  the  Iraq  war.  He  warned  there  were  "a  number  of  ways"  in  which 
opponents of the war could bring legal action. "We cannot be certain that they 
would not succeed," he said, adding a second UN resolution might be the way of 
preventing such legal action succeeding” (BBC News 2005). 
As Goldsmith stated on the 7 March, “I remain of the opinion that the safest legal 
course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorize the 
use of force. [...] The key point is that it should establish that the Council has 
concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 
1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled. However, the argument that 
resolution 1441alone has revived the authorization to use force in resolution 678 
will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that 
Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be 
able  to  demonstrate  hard  evidence  of  non-compliance  and  non-cooperation” 
(BBC  News  2005).  This  statement  reveals  the  attorney  General’s  less  than 
7 See link for Full UNSCR on: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1450113.html 
8 See link for Full UNSCR on: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9547153.html 
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enthusiastic advice on the legality of the war. However, Blair decided to bury the 
original version when he felt that Goldsmith advice was contrary to his political 
needs at that moment (Porter 2005). Lord Goldsmith's 7 March advice was never 
shown to the Cabinet - instead, the 17 March advice was. Porter further states 
that Blair style of leadership “has been manipulative of parliament and shown a 
preference  for  taking  crucial  decisions  away  from  cabinet  in  un-accounted 
meetings held with a few trusted - and usually unelected - advisers. The cabinet 
was not privy to that initial advice from Lord Goldsmith. Yet we can be sure that 
he did not air the doubts of March 7, otherwise we would certainly have heard 
about  it”  (Porter  2005).  The  fact  that  Goldsmith’s  doubts  were  not  disclosed 
suggests that the MP’s, the cabinet and the public were misled into believing that 
the war had the legal authorization. According to the Scotsman News, “Blair by 
deliberately withholding the Attorney General’s full advice from ministers and 
MPs,  has  subverted  Cabinet  government  and  come  close  to  deliberately 
misleading Parliament. Mr Blair’s  secretive approach over the legal advice on 
regime change exposed British service personnel to the risk of international legal 
action  without  their  being  properly  aware  of  it.  Blair’s  style  of  presidential 
leadership has been reflected on the way he concealed the detailed caveats of 
Lord  Goldsmith’s  legal  assessment.  He  has  side  shadowed  the  cabinet  and 
behaved as if the electorate is incapable of ever making an informed decision, 
and so must always be protected from the truth. So to ensure the parliamentary 
vote for the war, MPs and the public received a carefully-slanted view of the 
legal minefield surrounding military action by the coalition in order to garner as 
much  support  as  possible”  (2005).  As  John  Kampfner  comments  on  keeping 
Goldsmiths’ 7 march document secret to the parliament, “Blair was fully aware 
of  the  attorney's  legal  reservations,  for  that  reason  he  instructed  him  not  to 
declare  his  position  formally.  He  even  refused  to  circulate  that  7  March 
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document to the rest of the MP’s claiming that he cannot be trustful of them all. 
Committing to the US, Blair had to make the facts fit”, (Independent 2005). 
Furthermore, what also cannot be explained from a pluralist point of view is his 
distance from his European allies which believe in the international multilateral 
solutions of world problems as opposed to the unilateral approach of the United 
States.  Blair’s  close  alliance  with  right-wing  governments  such  as  Bush’s, 
Berlusconi’s, and Aznar’s highlights that contradiction in Blair’s foreign policy 
outlook outlined in his Third Way New Labourism. According to Coates and 
Krieger,  “New  Labour  stood  for  a  coherent  and  progressive  foreign  policy 
framework, one which saw that British foreign hold of the Old Labour model of 
imperialism and Atlanticism as inappropriate. However, Blair’s post 9/11 foreign 
policy posture has retreated to that model in an ungainly manner.  His policy 
retained an internationalist  perspective delivered with a set of laudable moral 
instincts; it has insisted that Britain actively participate in a robust global agenda; 
but it has sacrificed that multilateralism of New Labour’s original vision to the 
Bush Administration’s insistence that the US alone call the tune whether or not it 
pays the fiddler”, (2004, 110). In fact, it surrendered the principles and aims that 
guided the New Labour’s foreign policy. Throwing in his lot with the US, Blair 
has transformed his foreign policy to one that was described earlier as defiant 
internationalism; Blair’s foreign policy was characterized as Coates and Krieger 
further  elaborate  “by  risk  taking  strategy  to  advance  British  interests  and 
maximize national power and prestige, while simultaneously justifying this war 
by appeals to the international community, to the demands of interdependence 
and to  a  commitment  to  multilateral  institutions”,  (2004,  112).  Indeed,  Blair’s 
concur with the American government in the Iraqi war has contradicted those 
55
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
New Labourist values when he defied the international community, the nation 
and his party. 
Blair’s  use  of  public  morally-related  diplomacy  and  producing  manipulative 
dossiers  -  whether  relating  Iraq  to  terrorism  or  confirming  it  possession  of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction - to manage public opinion towards accepting a 
military intervention has shown that Blair’s argument for acting for the sake of 
the larger  international  community  reiterated in  his  Third Way Labourism is 
barely true. Blair’s alliance with the US in its unilateral action against Iraq despite 
all  divergences  discussed  above  failed  to  demonstrate  that  true  evangelical 
concern for  the ‘world’s  dispossessed’  which he  terms Ethical  Policy of  New 
Labour. 
2.3.1.3 Realist Perspective 
Based  on  this  discussion,  I  shall  assume  that  Blair’s  foreign  policy  decision 
making in the Iraqi war shall be best understood in terms of the realist school of  
thought which shall put answers to my aforementioned questions for neither the 
normative viewpoint of international relations nor the pluralist school of thought 
were able to explain fully the paradoxical behavior of Blair as have been seen. 
Therefore, this following chapter shall highlight the main pillars of realism that 
are expected to assist me in capturing the whole picture.    
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3. Realist School of Thought
Before attempting to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision of going to war,  I 
shall begin with highlighting the main pillars of the realist  school of thought. 
Throughout  presenting  its  main  assumptions,  I  shall  relate  them  with  the 
questions that I have arrived at in the previous chapter (p. 59). Applying the tools 
of the realist school of thought on the aforementioned questions is expected to 
assist me in explaining our case of Blair’s behaviour in the Iraq war that seems 
paradoxical and contradictory with his outlined Third Way Labourism. This will 
be achieved through testing two realist-based hypotheses:
• Following  the  9/11  events,  the  international  system  has  changed 
dramatically  witnessing  a  more  hegemonic,  militaristic,  unilateral, 
unipolar superpower such as the United States that acts in such a manner 
to shape a post 9/11 order which advances the American interests. As a 
result,  Blair  has seized the opportunity to tighten his country’s special 
relationship with that  hegemon through the form of bandwagoning to 
taste  the  fruits  of  victory  resultant  from  projecting  offensive  power 
overseas  along  the  US  under  the  name  of  ‘international  terrorism’;
• When  pursuing  the  national  interests  of  Britain  (ensued  from  such 
alliance) mainly security, military power, oil and influential power in the 
international arena, other domestic or transnational factors such as the 
public  opinion  or  the  European  Union  or  the  United  Nations  were 
considered to be irrelevant for Blair. This irrelevance was concealed by 
the various moral  and ethical  pretexts  and justifications used by Blair 
during the course of war as shown in the above chapter.  
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3.1 Main Pillars
Realism is the most dominant theoretical tradition in understanding International 
Relations.  “It  depicts  international  affairs  as  a  struggle for  power among self 
interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating 
conflict and war”, (Walt 1998, 31). 
Realism  is  not  a  single  theory;  there  are  the  classical  theorists  such  as 
Morgenthau who believe that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to 
dominate others, which led them to fight wars, (1978, 4). There are the structural 
realists  such  Kenneth  Waltz  who  focused  on  the  effects  of  the  international 
system.  For  Waltz,  the  international  system  consisted  of  a  number  of  great 
powers, each seeking to survive on its own due to the anarchic nature of that 
system which lacks  a  central  authority  that  protects  states  from one another, 
(1979).  This  defensive  modality  of  realism  is  countered  by  an  offensive  one 
represented in several scholars among of which is John Mearsheimer who argues, 
contrary to defensive realists, that the state of anarchy encourages states to try 
maximizing  their  relative  power  and  gains  through  conquest.  Such  military 
expansion or power projection has stopped to be considered cost-inefficient for 
states; i.e., the costs of conquest outweighing its benefits. On the contrary, war is 
seen now as profitable (2002).
According to Viotti and Kauppi, realism is based on a number of assumptions. 
States are the most important actors in world politics; world politics is analyzed 
with  states  taken  as  unitary  rational  actors,  carefully  calculating  costs  of 
alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize expected utility, although 
doing  so  under  conditions  of  uncertainty  and  insufficient  information  about 
alternatives; states seek power(both the ability to influence others and resources 
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that can be used to exercise influence); and most importantly in structural realism 
is that “states pursue their interests in ways it judges best(Viotti and Kaupi 1999, 
157). Force is a means of achieving the external goals of states because there exists 
no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that arise 
among similar units in a condition of  anarchic self-help system” (Waltz 1959, 
238). In realism, international institutions as the UN are considered as merely by-
products  of  the  interests  and capabilities  of  the  state.  They  have little  causal 
importance  apart  from  power  and  interest;  they  will  continue  to  influence 
behaviour  if  the  interests  of  the  political  actors  change.  Unlike  in  neoliberal 
institutionalism,  these  institutions  are  unable  to  mitigate  system’s  anarchy’s 
constraining effects on the behaviour of the states (Grieco 1988, 485).   
Kenneth Walz’s Theory of International Relations (1979) is considered one of the 
main theoretical pieces of structural realism. In this work, Waltz emphasizes the 
system; by changing the nature of the system, international relations can change. 
This work is dependent on his previous one Man, the State and War (1954). In 
this latter, Waltz identifies three images behind the causes of war. The first one is 
that human nature is the cause of war. If human nature is evil, corrupt, power-
hungry then the same must be true of state behaviour since states are made up of 
and governed by people (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 131). The second 
image holds  that  the causes of  war are found within states;  domestic  society 
conditions human behaviour.  If  so,  then different types of social  organization 
should cause different behaviours. Bad states cause war and good states seek 
peace. Such theories argue that a world of democracies, or a world of capitalist 
states, or a world of socialist states would bring peace while it is the absence of 
democracy or capitalism or socialism which leads to war. However, Waltz does 
not find enough evidence to advocate one form of state above the others; he says 
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that he is unable to establish a causal link between one type of state and war 
(132). The third image is what related to his Theory of international Relations in 
which he emphasizes the system as the main cause for war; the nature of the 
system  conditions  state  behaviour.  According  to  Waltz,  the  best  way  to 
understand human behaviours is to understand it as conditioned by society; we 
are  products  of  a  social  environment.  The  same  holds  true  for  international 
relations. Anarchy is the key characteristic of the international system and results 
from the absence of a central authority, a world government, for example, able to 
maintain  order.  In  anarchy,  order  is  a  result  of  the  interactions  of  states  (as 
quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 134). However, Waltz rejects the idea that a 
balance of power is inevitable, inherent or natural. Instead, states will use force to 
get what they want if they value that interest more than peace. This means that 
states engage in cost-benefit  analyses  and will  choose war if  they believe the 
benefits of a use of force outweigh its costs (135). 
In his Theory of International Relations, Waltz elaborates more on this concept of 
system.  Waltz  believes  that  a  proper  understanding  of  international  politics 
begins with the system. A system is a set of interacting units. But to this idea 
Waltz adds the structure,  the organization of  units.  The purpose of  a  system 
theory  is  to  explain  how  structures  affect  systemic  interactions  and  how 
interactions influence the structure. What best explains the pattern observed in 
international politics is anarchy as opposed to hierarchy which prevails at the 
unit  level.  The  most  basic  self-interest  in  such  an  anarchic  environment  is 
survival. To survive, states tend to emulate those who are most successful. This 
means that all states look alike functionally but differ in power capabilities. States 
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do  as  best  they  can  for  themselves,  and  they  avoid,  as  much  as  possible, 
dependence on others9. 
Consequently,  what goes on within a  state  does not  matter.  History,  culture, 
ideology,  political  institutions,  economic organization,  people’s will  –  none of 
this matters. All that matters is that some states are more successful than others 
doing what all states try to do. Some states are better able to survive than others 
and it is this degree of success and failure, this distribution of capabilities that 
creates  the  structure.  The  structure  constrains  and  limits  state  behaviour  by 
limiting choices. Another way of thinking about this – since structure is based on 
state  capabilities;  states  constrain and limit  each other.  By understanding the 
structure and the impact of the structure on the system it is possible to not only 
explain state behaviour but also predict it. By understanding where a state is in 
the structure, it should be possible to predict the behaviour of that state, although 
we cannot know with certainty what a state will do. 
In such an international system, realists focus on the distribution of capabilities. 
The states  power  is  measured by  its  capabilities  and power  relative  to  other 
states. The distribution of capabilities among states is what alters the system into 
unipolar (one hegemon possessing the greatest capabilities),  bipolar (two-state 
system) or multipolar (several great powers). Achieving the national security and 
survival in an anarchic self-help system is the primary goal of states; that is why 
stated  tend  to  build  alliances  and  balance  the  most  dominant  power  in  the 
system in what Waltz describes as “Balance of power”(as quoted in Viotti and 
Kauppi 1999,  72).  Given the assumptions that the system is anarchic,  and the 
state is both rational and unitary seeking to survive, states inevitably interact in 
9 http://www.cascadia.ctc.edu/Faculty/jmiller/realism.html. (Accessed 19/9/2005)
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the  competitive  environment  of  international  relations  in  order  to  achieve 
equilibrium/balance  of  power  or  system  stability.  “This  balance  of  power  is 
imposed by events on statesmen in which these latter can do little in affecting 
their surroundings”, (Waltz 1979, 121). 
This analysis is expected to assist me in explaining the behaviour of Blair to use 
or  threaten to use force  against  Iraq to attain his  objectives  regardless  of  the 
domestic opposition to his aggressive policies. I propose to use Waltz’s system’s 
characteristics (1979, 93) summarized in as follows for this purpose:
• Anarchic rather than hierarchic
• Interaction is among units with similar function,
• Distribution of capabilities varies from system to system and over time. 
The  most  significant  capabilities  are  those  of  the  most  powerful 
structures.
The link between system structure and actor behaviour is forged by rationality 
which  will  enable  me  as  an  analyst  to  analyze  how  Blair  responded  to  the 
incentives  and  constraints  imposed  by  his  surrounding  international 
environment(particularly  after  the  9/11 attacks)  he described as  “  the  risk  of 
terrorism and states developing weapons of mass destruction”, (Blair 2003). That 
action was manifested in allying with the US so as to maximise Britain’s power 
and capabilities relevant to other states in the international structure in order to 
remain influential both domestically, trans-nationally (among EU members) and 
most importantly, internationally.
However, what happened in the Iraqi war is against what Waltz would predict in 
terms of “balance of power”. If complying with Waltz’s prediction, then Blair 
should  balance  the  United  States  as  a  unipole  in  order  to  prevent  it  from 
triumphing  or  dominating  others  including  Britain.  Blair’s  action  might  be 
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argued that it is a function of the international system prevalent after the 9/11 
attacks  and  the  war  on  terrorism  which  motivated  him  to  ensure  that  the 
historical  Anglo-American  relationship  remains  close  as  ever;  however,  Blair 
attempted to bandwagon with rather than balance this ever-rising superpower. 
How can this be understood?
3.1.1. Bandwagoning vs. Balancing
In an article by Fritz and Sweeney, interest similarity between two allying states 
is  the  main  motivation  for  bandwagoning  as  opposed to  what  would  Waltz 
would  argue  that  states  balance  each  other  to  achieve  security,  survival  and 
stability  (2004,  429).  However,  Walt   notes  that  statesmen  often  operated  as 
though bandwagoning was the  most common alliance  behaviour, that  over-
large winning coalitions were prevalent during systemic wars such as WWII, and 
that the decision of the Western European Great Powers to ally with the United 
States after World War Two all  fly  in the  face of the balance of power argument. 
Walt  amends balance of power theory,  by arguing that  states  do not  balance 
power,  per  se,  but  balance  threat.  He  further  upholds  that  notion that  states 
balance by allying with the least threatening option and rarely bandwagon with 
the most threatening side (as quoted in Fritz and Sweeney 2004, 430). 
Despite agreeing with Walt on the fact that threat might be a determinant factor 
for states alliances, Fritz and Sweeney disagree with him on the definitions of 
balancing and bandwagoning. They both define these terms in terms of power 
capability: “a Great power bandwagons if it  chooses to ally with the stronger 
option and balances if it chooses to ally with the weaker option”, (2004, 430). 
63
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
Fritz and Sweeney used a censored model of Great Power alliance formation for 
the period of 1816-1992 to generalize that states ally based on interest rather than 
power (Fritz and Sweeney 2004,  428).   This  pattern has  three mechanisms to 
explain (433):   
• If state interests vary from pure security seeking to unlimited non-
security-related set  of  interests ,  it  is  easy to imagine that  state 
with similar dispositions find it worthwhile to ally no matter the 
distribution of power among states in the international system.
• In  considering  state  interests,  both  security  and  non-security 
issues  should  be  included.  That  is,  states  may  ally  either  to 
provide  themselves  additional  security  against  a  PERCIEVED 
threat or to advance interests in terms of gains they can make in 
the international arena. States’ motives’ to bandwagon go beyond 
security issues and maintaining the status quo to sharing in the 
gains of victory-territory, resources or reputation. In short, allying 
can be a defensive measure as well as a means to profit.
• Since states do not constantly face high- insecurity environments, 
they are free to follow their interest unconstrained by the need to 
balance power or threat. Consequently, bandwagoning would be 
the optimal option to gain in the international system. 
 
According to Schweller (1994), if states value what they covet more than what 
they possess, allying with a strong partner than can help to achieve these ends is 
an efficient way to profit in the international system (as quoted in Donnelly 2000, 
10).
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“Tying together all the above motivations for allying with the stronger side is 
common interest among states. This, combined with the notion that under certain 
circumstances bandwagoning can provide states with the means to advance their 
security and non-security interest, makes it not at all surprising that states join 
the stronger side quite frequently. It is  the consideration of interests first that 
drives alliance formation”, (Fritz and Sweeney 2004, 437). 
Rather than driven by motives of threat, regime type, or geographic proximity 
for forming alliances, Sweeney and Fritz conclude in their study10 that security 
and non-security interests may provide a wider picture for alliance formation 
because simply alliances are simple tools  of  statecraft  to  achieve certain ends 
which  are  determined  by  interests  rather  than  considerations  of  power. 
Furthermore,  both  authors  believe  that  the  balance  of  power  explanations 
describe alliance decisions only in high security environments but when survival 
is not at stake; bandwagoning is likely common to occur especially in spheres of 
influence (2004). 
This argument does not marginalize the importance of security as a value that 
combines both relative and absolute gains along with other set of state interests. 
However,  it  draws a wider  picture  for  reasons for  alliance formation that  go 
beyond pure security motives. Nonetheless, states might still want to bandwagon 
(ally with the stronger) to maximize their relative power against an existent or 
illusive  security  threatening  reason  such  as  terrorism  for  example.  Here,  as 
Zakaria argues, “the best solution to the perennial problem of the uncertainty of 
10 For further information regarding this study and the structure model, please refer to Sweeney, Kevin and Paul Fritz. 
2004. “Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power alliances.” The Journal of Politics 
66(2):428-449.
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international  life  is  for  a  state  to  increase  its  control  over  that  environment 
through the persistent expansion of its political interests abroad”, (1998, 20). In 
this case, states conceive of their security in competitive (offensive) rather fearful 
(defensive)  ways  depending  on  whether  one  invades  for  safety  or  for  gain 
(Donnelly 2000). 
Donnelly  (2000)  agrees  with  Schweller  arguing  that  “political  actors  whether 
great or middle powers tend to bandwagon, not only in a hierarchy but also in an 
anarchy, with the growing power in order to increase their chance of gaining in 
the spoils of victory. Because the risks of survival tend to be relatively low, even 
the diffident can focus most of their efforts on the pursuit of absolute gains”, 
(2000,  117).  “Whether  bandwagoning  is  a  rational  strategy  depends  on  the 
relative risks and benefits of following and opposing a leader - which change 
from issue to issue and from leader to leader. And lesser powers may ally with a 
superpower to pursue gain rather than out of fear of the other superpower or the 
threatening power of a neighbour” (118).  
Schweller (1994) argues that bandwagoning does not necessarily contradict with 
balancing; for this depends on the surrounding environment in the international 
system and whether the state wants to pursue relative gains or absolute ones. He 
notes  that  while  scholars  have argued that  states  balance  against  threatening 
increases  in  others'  power,  foreign-policy practitioners  through the ages have 
believed that states bandwagon with power. Seeking to explain this discrepancy, 
Schweller argues that it  is a mistake to view balancing and bandwagoning as 
opposite behaviours motivated by the same goal of achieving security. He argues 
that states frequently bandwagon opportunistically, as well as when threatened, 
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and that thus bandwagoning may indeed be far more common than balancing 
(1994, 72). 
This type of alliance is expected to assist me in explaining Britain’s alliance with 
the US especially after WWII particularly following the events of 9/11. 
3.1.2 Public Opinion in Realism
Realist  accounts  of  international  relations  are  based  on  a  theory  of  strong 
leadership  of  domestic  public  opinion.  Realists  and  neorealists  argue  that 
domestic  elite  actors'  participation  in  foreign  policy  making  is  the  critical 
intervening process that connects a state's behaviour with the imperatives of its 
external environment. Opinion leadership by chief executives is especially critical 
in representative democracies. Policy makers are expected to exercise both strong 
direction  of  public  opinion  and  minimal  intentional  responsiveness  to  the 
public's policy preferences; "responsible" elites mobilize or create public support 
behind  a  foreign  policy  that  they  have  independently  identified  as  best 
advancing the nation's international positions and interests (Jacobs and Shapiro 
1999, 1).
Jacobs and Shapiro (1999) further argue that effective government depends on 
officeholders combining insulation from the public's policy preferences with the 
pursuit of coherent policies that prompt the public and other elites to modify, as 
needed, their attitudes and behaviour. The citizenry's role should be limited to 
selecting  leaders  in  competitive  struggles;  once  elected,  officeholders  are 
expected  to  assert  decisive  leadership  in  reaching  substantive  decisions  and 
mobilizing public support for their policies.
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Realist  theory  of  opinion  leadership  is  consistent  with  this  tradition  of  elites 
providing  strong  direction.  Realists  such  as  Hans  Morgenthau  and  Kenneth 
Waltz assume that  governments  must independently formulate foreign policy 
and then lobby public opinion to secure public approval for its initiative. 
According to realism, elites are expected to minimize responsiveness to public 
opinion in  choosing “between a  good foreign policy [designed by the  expert 
statesman] and a bad one that  public  opinion demands”.  The problem, Hans 
Morgenthau (1978) and others argue, is the “unavoidable gap” between public 
attitudes and the “kind of thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign 
policy”. Elites are uniquely qualified to make foreign policy because they possess 
substantial  objective  knowledge  and  capacity  for  complex  and  hard-headed 
reasoning about the realities of global power struggles; a “statesman's thinking” 
includes such superior "qualities" as the tendency to “take the long view” and 
accept "small losses for great future advantage." In contrast, the public goes back 
and forth, fluctuating among different positions based on the “simple moralistic 
and legalistic  terms of  absolute  good and absolute  evil”;  public  attitudes  are 
driven  by  shifting  "moods"  and  a  hunger  for  “quick  results”  that  “sacrifice 
tomorrow's real benefit” (Morgenthau 1978, 135, 146-47). 
Realists, then, expect “responsible” government to shield foreign policy making 
from the  distorting influence  of  public  thinking  even “at  the  risk  of  its  own 
political  futures.”  “Bad”  policy  is  likely  to  be  the  result  when  officeholders 
assume that public beliefs can be “discovered and classified by public-opinion 
polls as plants are by botanists.” A government's decision to respond to public 
preferences  amounts  to  "sacrificing  ...  good  policy  upon  the  altar  of  public 
opinion  ...  and  exchanging  short-lived  political  advantage  for  the  permanent 
interests of the country" (Morgenthau 1978, 146-48). 
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In the following chapter, I shall examine this realist expectation of the minimal 
responsiveness to and strong manipulation of public opinion in the context of 
Blair’s exaggeration of the threat posed by Iraq in order to shape public opinion 
toward accepting the military attack against Iraq. Although a Prime Minister of a 
democratic state in which listening to the will of the public opinion is part of the 
participatory  approach  in  formulating  foreign  policy,  Blair  chose  to  act  as  a 
“Presidential Prime Minister” just like his predecessor Margaret Thatcher; i.e. he 
operated in a manner where he believed fit for the pursuit of the national interest 
regardless of the public interest. As Doig and Phythian argue, highlighting the 
national interests of a states are considered to be part of the high politics which 
might be seen as continuing core executive responsibilities in terms of  policy 
formulation  and  implementation  (2005,  369).  This  reflects  what  has  been 
described in the previous chapter about Blair’s style of leadership that has the 
capacity to work on a centralized and unified basis on key strategic issues such as 
waging war with little concern over public opinion.         
3.1.3 Power of Interests
Within  this  framework  of  formulating  the  state’s  national  interest  and  in  an 
anarchic  self-help  system,  states  aim  at  achieving  their  interests  that  are 
embodied mainly in the national security and survival. This comes by enhancing 
the  power  capabilities  as  relevant  to  the  other  states.  Such interests-based 
motivations were described by one of the most important theorists of realism, 
that  is  Morgenthau’s  Politics  among  Nations:  The  Struggle  for  Power  and  Peace 
(1978). In his essay, Morgenthau referred to the “concept of interest defined in 
terms of power which provides the link between reason trying to understand 
international  politics  and  the  facts  to  be  understood”,  (1978,  4).  The  main 
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signpost  that  helps political  realism to find its  way through the landscape of 
international  politics  is  the  concept  of  interest  defined  in  terms  of  power”, 
(Morgenthau 1954,  5).  He adds that  “the objectives of foreign policy must  be 
defined  in  terms  of  the  national  interest  and  must  be  supported  with  the 
adequate power. We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest 
defined as power, (Morgenthau 1978, 5). “This fact comes against two popular 
fallacies:  the  concern  with  moral  motives  and  the  concern  with  ideological 
preferences”, (5). One might argue that Blair’s foreign policy in the Iraqi war was 
inspired  by  the  ethical  policy  presented  in  his  Third  Way  Labourism  which 
sought to preserve world order and protect human rights worldwide. Yet, his 
policies along the United States brought war and misery to both his people and 
the Iraqi people. Hence, what is important in understanding the behaviour of the 
statesman such as Blair’s is not primarily the motives and intentions he might 
pronounce in his speeches but the political ability that leads him in performing 
into a certain political action (Morgenthau 1978, 6). To Morgenthau, “statesmen 
may  well  make  a  habit  of  presenting  their  foreign  policies  in  terms  of  their 
philosophic sympathies only in order to gain popular support for them. Yet, they 
will think and act in terms of the national interest”, (6). These interests, not the 
ideas  or  ideals,  determined  the  political  action  of  Blair  when  he  decided  to 
unilaterally  ally  with  the  US  despite  all  divergences  and  paradoxes.  For 
Morgenthau, states, living in a self-help anarchic world, tend to maximize their 
power capabilities defined as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other 
men”, (1978, 8).  Hence, statesmen think in terms of interest defined as power 
whereby the appropriate question to be asked: “How does this policy affect the 
power of the nation?” The political ethics that might be used these statesmen is 
not  judged  by  its  conformity  with  the  moral  law  but  rather  by  its  political 
consequences, mainly the national survival. That is why he tends to subordinate 
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these other moral standards including nationalism, patriotism and ideology to 
those of politics and disguise the bare political truth to ensure the maximization 
of the national interests (9). 
States living in a state of war, whether real or imaginative, tend to enhance their 
power capabilities in relation to other states’  capabilities in order to maintain 
security and survival within a system that obligates them to behave in a certain 
manner in order to preserve their existence despite the will of the people.
 
Machiavelli, on the other hand, in his famous work, The Prince, believed that the 
moral obligations of the rulers are only considered to guarantee survival of the 
state. In this framework, the end – represented mainly by the state’s security and 
survival  –  is  understood  to  justify  any  means  necessary  to  achieve  that  end 
especially in a self help system characterized by anarchy and chaos. Therefore, 
the very existence and stability  of  the state  are of  great  paramount  that  they 
might justify immoral actions by the statesmen who consistently think of how to 
gain, maintain and expand power to achieve those goals (as quoted in Viotti and 
Kauppi  1999,  59).  According  to  Machiavelli,  ethics  and  politics  should  be 
divorced from each other as requires the world as is not the world as would or 
ought to be. If statesmen abandoned what is done for what should be done, then 
they would bring about their ruin rather than their preservation (60).         
Based on the above survey of realism’s main assumptions, we can summarize the 
following:
1. International system is a self-help one that is characterized by anarchy;
2.  Basic  units  are  states  which  interact  within  that  system to  maximise  their 
interests in order to survive that system;
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3.  To maintain their security and survival,  states tend either to form alliances 
either by balancing or bandwagoning;
4. Institutions whether in the form of bodies such as the UN or patterns such as 
multilaterism are irrelevant in the cost-benefit calculations of the statesmen who 
only think of power in terms of interests;
5. The natural state of the system is war in which force is used to attain military 
and economic benefits.
Based on those main pillars, one can explain the reasons for Blair’ decision which 
seemed to diverge to a great extent from his Third Way Labourism. In fact, Blair’s 
involvement in the Iraq war was motivated by pure national interests of which 
Iraq and its people were almost irrelevant. Blair’s  government’s task in defining 
the national interest in the Iraq case lay in balancing the demands of three key 
political relationships – the 'Trans-Atlantic Alliance' with the US, the so-called 
'special  relationship',  the  membership  of  the  European  Union  and,  Britain’s 
position with the United Nations- in terms of pro-US war faction and anti-US 
war faction 11. On the basis of these considerations, Britain, and therefore Blair in 
our  case  here,  defined  its  national  interests  both  economic  (mainly  oil-based 
interest) and military (capabilities) as being best served by preserving its close 
working relationship with the US, even if this meant taking Britain into a war in 
Iraq  at  almost  all  costs  and  divergences  such  as  opposing  European  Union 
members and defying the will of both his people and the United Nations. 
Putting this into context and taking the aforementioned hypotheses in mind, the 
argument of explaining Blair’s decision in the Iraqi war becomes that Blair, aware 
11 Post details: Bush, Blair and Iraq: Adventures in RealPolitik. Available at: 
http://talkpolitics.users20.donhost.co.uk/index.php?p. Accessed on 14 August 2005. 
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of the international structure dominated by one single hegemon, saw the war as 
an opportunity  to  maximize his  country’s  national  interests  to  enable  him to 
“punch above Britain’s weight” in the international affairs and boost Britain’s 
influence  in  the  world.  Ensuring the  support  of  the  US behind his  back will 
strengthen his political position both in Europe and the rest of the world. Not 
only that, but it will bolster its security and military capabilities. In addition, it 
will guarantee the unrestricted flow of oil resources to an industrialized Britain, a 
fact which adds to its power and secures its survival and existence in the self-
help anarchic system. A form of bandwagoning, rather than a traditional balance 
of power, characterized Blair’s response to the new hegemonic structure through 
which Britain accepted the unipolarity of the US by strengthening the US-UK 
special relationship despite all domestic and regional contradictions. That is why, 
Blair  offered  unprecedented support  to  the  US  following the  9/11  attacks  to 
tighten the historical special relationship that ties both countries in an attempt to 
achieve his aims that were concealed by multiple justifications as described in the 
previous  chapter.  Public  opinion,  European  opposition,  and  parliamentary 
outrage  were  secondary  factors  of  concern  to  Blair  in  the  face  of  the  above. 
Shielding information or not  sharing it  with the rest  of  the societal  factors is 
perceived by the realism as necessary in order not to jeopardize foreign policy 
gains and interests.  
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4. A Realist Explanation of Blair’s Decision Making in the Iraq war 2003
According to realists, Blair’s decision to join the US mission to disarm Iraq by 
force is deeply emanating from the sense of national interests that he wishes to 
maximise. What motivated the Prime Minister to send 46,00012 UK troops to fight 
a war which lacked UN Security Council  authorization,  not to mention being 
opposed by 139 MPs in his own party and a significant proportion of the British 
people lies in maintaining the Anglo-American special relationship in a desire to 
advance the British national interests; i.e. guaranteeing oil supplies, securing a 
world  status  in  the  international  arena,  remaking  the  world  or  at  least  a 
significant portion of it , buying insurance against possible security threats, etc…
So in order to understand Blair’s decision in the Iraq war, one should emphasize 
the role  of the international  order characterizing the hegemonic power of  the 
United States especially after the 9/11 events and the war on terrorism and its 
impact  on  the  Anglo-American  relations.  This  variable  has  intensified  Blair’s 
motivations to tighten that Anglo-American relationship to gain as much benefits 
as possible in the name of fighting the global terror. The other variable existent in 
our realist-based hypothesis above is the national interest :Military build-up and 
oil  shares which are considered as the most driving factor for survival in the 
world  of  politics  especially  for  an  industrial  country  just  like  Britain  and  of 
course, the United States. 
Within this framework, the sensitivity to the public or the European friends were 
issues  of  little  concern  when  it  came  to  the  national  interests  of  Britain  as 
12 Dunne,  Tim.  2004.  ‘When  the  shooing  starts’:  Atlanticism  in  British  Security  Strategy. 
International Affairs 80: 64-80.
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perceived by Tony Blair. More will be explained on this point during the course 
of this chapter based on what have been discussed earlier. 
Therefore, in accordance with the assumptions of the realist school of thought, 
Blair’s decision was a function of the international system that is characterized by 
anarchy and self-help as described by Waltz. In an anarchic world, states will use 
force to get  what they want if  they value that  interest more than peace.  This 
coincides with Hobbes that states engage in cost-benefit analyses and will choose 
war  if  they  believe  the  benefits  of  a  use  of  force  outweigh  its  costs.  This  is 
applicable  to  our  case  here  in  the  sense  that  Blair  magnified  the  threat  of 
terrorism to prove that the costs of not responding to this risk might outweigh 
those  when  responding  although  based  on  unclear  or  mistaken  intelligence 
information.  On  5  March  2004,  Tony  Blair  gave  a  speech  in  his  Sedgefield 
constituency in which he sought to justify his actions in Iraq by emphasising the 
unprecedented threat that global terrorism poses to the civilised world. He called 
this threat 'real and existential', and argued that politicians had no choice but to 
confront it 'whatever the political cost', (Runicman 2004). By seeking to present 
the Iraq case in terms of costs and benefits, Blair, taking all the rational choices 
and  strategies  that  he  expects  to  best  advance  national  interests  within  the 
constraints imposed by capabilities and information ,  believed the war as the 
optimal option. Perceiving the threat of terrorism, Blair’s rational choice was to 
join the most hegemonic power in the international arena; that is the US, in its 
‘claimed’ fight against global terrorism in the events of 9/11 in order to ensure 
survival  in  the  face  of  the  imminent  existential  threat  of  terrorism.  Despite 
erroneous intelligence information about the existence of WMD in Iraq ready to 
be  launched  against  Britain  in  45  minutes,  as  the  September  JIC  Intelligence 
Dossier suggested, Blair would defend himself on the basis of the precautionary 
/ pre-emptive rule; i.e., to err on the cautionary side is much safer and less costly. 
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A rational risk assessment, according to the assumption of realism, would have 
meant laying bare the real necessities and the real incidents at each stage of the 
decision-making process.  It  would also have laid bare the really stark choice: 
either politicians do what the risk assessors tell them, in which case they have no 
judgment,  or  they  make  up  their  own  minds,  in  which  case  they  have  full 
judgment. The September dossier was an attempt to blur this distinction. The job 
of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is  to weigh the risks associated with 
different pieces of intelligence, including the risk that some of them might be 
wrong, so that politicians can exercise their judgment. But the dossier, which was 
said to reflect the view of the JIC and not the politicians, made no mention of 
risk. It merely judged the intelligence to be true which allowed Blair to judge that 
it had to be acted on and to persuade Parliament of the same although he did not 
provide that parliament with the all the risk assessments on which to make an 
appropriate decision. From a realist viewpoint: in the face of a threat (whether 
existential  or  illusive),  some  risks  are  just  not  worth  considering  (Runicman 
2004). Obscuring part of the information using his power as a Prime Minister 
proves the fact that Blair, whether intentionally or unintentionally, manipulated 
the  parliament  and his  people  into  believing  that  the  war  was  the  rationally 
justified.    
In fact, Blair was willing to sacrifice his people’s trust, the alliance with some of 
his European friends and the credibility of both his party and parliament to stay 
“shoulder  in  shoulder”  with  the  United  States  and  ensure  ensued  interests. 
Perceiving  no  threat  from  the  side  of  that  hegemon in  the  orbit  of  the  new 
international  structure  whereby that  hegemon is  the  dominant,  Britain  under 
Blair’s leadership decides to bandwagon with it so as to share the cake of benefits 
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and gains arising from the war on global terrorism of which the Iraqi case is a 
microcosmic incident facing the Anglo-American historical partnership.
For sixty years since WWII,  Britain's foreign policy has been all but inextricably 
linked  with  that  of  the  senior  partner  in  the  most  significant  international 
alliance; the United States. The nature of US power has tremendous bearing on 
the  fate  of  the  UK.  Understanding  that  power,  its  motives  and  the  British 
government's  relationship  with it  are  essential  if  we are  to  properly judge 
Blair’s decision in this Iraq war.  As US dominance has increased in the post 
Cold War era, the nature of Britain’s closest ally has been changing accordingly. 
Now  in  the  early  21st  century,  Blair’s  Britain  is  faced  with  an  ambitious, 
militaristic and aggressive hyper power - one that accepts no limits and tolerates 
not even the slightest challenge to its dominance. Within this order shaped by the 
perception of the imminent threat of terrorism, Blair acted opportunistically in 
the  name  of  this  global  terrorism  to  get  closer  to  the  historical  partner  to 
guarantee  an  influential  role  in  the  international  arena  especially  among  his 
European peers who are relatively militaristically weak/ unwilling to invest in 
military power/ compared to Britain’s power. This would give him the leverage 
to influence the political environment at both sides of the Atlantic as well as in 
the rest of world issues since Britain will be perceived as America’s closest ally; 
one which has the power to impact and bring about change. 
4.1 Blair’s Response to the Surrounding System of American Pre-     eminence 
and Dominance 
American global power – military, economic, technological, cultural, and political 
– is one of the great realities of our age. Never before has one country been so 
powerful and unrivalled. The United States began the 1990s as the world’s only 
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superpower and its advantages continued to grow through the decade. After the 
Cold War, the United States reduced its military spending at a slower rate than 
other countries and its economy grew at a faster pace. The globalization of the 
world  economy  has  reinforced  American  economic  and  political  dominance. 
More  recently  and,  in  response  to  the  9/11  attacks,  the  United  States  has 
embarked on a massive military build-up. In the National Security Strategy that 
followed that catastrophe, the Bush administration has articulated an ambitious 
and provocative global military role for the United States in confronting new-age 
threats.  Overall,  American  power  advantages  are  multidimensional  and 
unprecedented. 
According  to  Ikenberry,  American  unipolarity  is  manifested  in  a  number  of 
characteristics. First, the United States is a unique sort of global superpower. That 
is,  it  has  a  distinctive  cluster  of  capabilities,  institutions,  attractions,  and 
impulses. Indeed, American power is manifest in complex and paradoxical ways. 
That is why it is difficult for countries to decide to work with or against this once 
liberal  power  working  to  promote  multilaterism  and  partnership,  and  once 
imperial power working against the interests and goals of other states. Second, 
America  is  considered  to  be  the  underwriter  of  American  capitalism  and 
globalization and the leader of a global political and military alliance system. 
Third,  the  United  States  has  the  largest  power  capabilities  in  the  world  that 
makes  it  hard  to  easily  counterbalance  it.  In  fact,  the  American  military 
expenditures  are  greater  than  the  next  fourteen  countries  combined  –  and  if 
current trends continue, the United States military expenditures will be equal to 
the rest of the world combined by 2007. Fourth, the American unipolar order is 
also  organized  around  democratic  polities  and  a  complex  web  of 
intergovernmental institutions – which serves the interest of the United States by 
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making its  power more legitimate,  expansive,  and durable.  This would make 
Western  Democracies  less  able  or  willing  to  use  power  in  an  arbitrary  and 
indiscriminate  manner  against  other  democracies,  according  to  Kantian 
Democratic Peace Theory (2003). 
The unipolarity formed in the wake of the Cold War has intensified and grew 
more  obvious since the 9/11 attacks,  a  fact  which created a  new geopolitical 
context  that  required  adaptation  from  the  world  countries.  However,  this 
adaptation has not been in the form of traditional balance of power as would 
structural realists suggest. Although the power capabilities of one of the units in 
the world structure has altered but this does not necessary entail a new balance 
of power would result in order to achieve systemic equilibrium. 
According to Ikenberry, 
“the major powers – Russia, China, Germany, France, Britain and Japan – 
will attempt to resist, work around, and counter American power -- even as 
they also engage and work with American power. But they are not likely to 
join in an anti-American countervailing coalition that will break the world 
up into hostile, competing camps. The balance of power is the most time-
honoured way of thinking about politics among the great powers. In this 
classical view, however, when confronted with a rising and dominant state, 
weaker  states  flock  together  and  build  an  alternative  power  bloc.  The 
classical geological tool of balance of power will not remedy the concern of 
those states regarding the ever-rising American power”, (2003). 
 Since forming a counter-coalition to balance the United States and seek to loosen 
ties and undercut or block its power is neither sufficient nor easy to assemble 
based  on  the  previously  mentioned  features  of  that  superpower,  the  best 
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geopolitical tool to deal with the American hegemony would be bandwagoning 
with  the  superpower;  i.e.,  entailing  appeasement  methods  and  building 
cooperative  ties  in  the  hope  of  gaining  opportunities  and  absolute  gains 
(Ikenberry 2003). 
There are two strategies to deal with this concerted power; either by balancing 
and forming a  counter-alliance  to  resist  this  rising  power  or  bandwagoning/ 
bonding  with  the  hegemon  power;  i.e.  making  the  dominant  state  less 
threatening to weaker states by embedding that power in rules and institutions 
that channel and limit the ways that power is exercised. The strategy to balance 
the US proves to be costly and impossible at both military and economic levels, 
based on the above. Therefore, the best strategy to deal with this unprecedented 
unipolarity  of  the  United  States  is  the  bandwagoning/  bonding  strategy. 
Bandwagoning is a strategy that can encompass a wide range of state behaviour 
but it essentially entails policies that support and accommodate the dominant 
power. Weaker states seek to work with rather than resist the dominant state – 
and  they  look  for  opportunities  to  advance  their  interests  without  directly 
challenging the dominant state. Bandwagoning can take various forms – ranging 
from simple appeasement to more active attempts to work with and manipulate 
the policies of the leading state.   
During the Iraq war,  British  Prime Minister  Tony Blair  pursued that  form of 
bandwagoning which Ikenberry called the bonding strategy in which Blair has 
got as close as possible to the Bush administration. The strategy was to be so 
close  and  supportive  of  the  American  exercise  of  power  that  Britain  would 
ultimately get some say in how policy unfolds in the international arena (2003). 
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4.2 Anglo-American Special Relationship: Historical Synopsis and   Impact of 
9/11 Events
This close relationship manifested itself as a continuation of the Anglo-American 
special relationship which Blair sought to strengthen in the wake of 9/11 attacks 
and America’s global war on terrorism. His publicized justifications of regime 
change, existence of WMD and the morality of the war against Iraq were only 
pretexts to bandwagon with that hegemon for interest-based motivations.  What 
seems more persuasive and explanatory of Blair’s deep involvement in the Iraqi 
war,  according  to  Azubuike,  is  his  motivation  to  advance  British  national 
interests  through strengthening the  special  relationship with the US in  all  its 
aspects (2003, 64).  
Prior  elaborating  more  on  the  benefits  resulting  from  Blair’s  support  of  the 
American-led war; let us first highlight the main aspects of the Anglo-American 
special relationship, for the Iraq war was microcosmic to that relationship and a 
continuation of it. 
According  to  Rachman,  “it  remains  true  that  the  country  retains  a  special 
relationship with the United States in intelligence, in nuclear affairs, in a military 
alliance, and more amorphously, but perhaps most importantly, in cultural and 
intellectual  life”  (2001,  8).  In  fact,  Britain  continues  to  share  security  and 
intelligence information (formerly to face Communism and now ‘terrorism’) with 
the US along other  English-speaking countries  that  it  does not  share  with its 
European allies. This closeness of the intelligence relationship is linked to Great 
Britain’s nuclear relationship with the United States. Along with its permanent 
seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Great Britain’s possession of a 
small nuclear deterrent is crucial to its claim to be more than just another middle-
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ranking  power.  Historically,  Britain  saw  that  this  closeness  to  an  enormous 
power such as the USA’s is needed in order achieve global goals that best serve 
its  interests  especially  after  the  relative  decline  in  Britain’s  power  and  its 
challenge by other powers such as France, Germany and Russia. Intelligence and 
nuclear  weapons  lead  naturally  to  the  third  element—close  military  and 
diplomatic cooperation since the eruption of WWI. Allies during the first and 
second world wars, Great Britain and the United States also shared a Cold War 
experience as occupying powers in Germany and allies within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). According to Dumbrell (2001), although displaying 
different  views  concerning  the  Vietnam  War  and  the  Bosnia  conflict,  both 
regained harmony in the Kosovo conflict (to a certain degree) and the Gulf war 
1991(Dumbrell  2001).  The final  element  is  the  economic  cooperation  between 
both  countries  for  both  countries  adopted  the  Washington  consensus  on 
economic liberalization and opening up of global markets. Not only that, but the 
US also constitutes Britain’s biggest and most lucrative export market as well as a 
friendly magnet for the largest British business and oil corporations despite the 
asymmetry of both economies and the Europeanization of the British economy. 
In  fact,  the  economic  interdependence  of  both  countries  had  and  still  has 
considerable  benefits  on  the  British  market.  In  numbers,  an  Observer  article 
published the following facts regarding the economic transactions between both 
countries (2003):
• The US/UK investment relationship is worth $376bn, split almost 
equally between the countries;
• About 35 per cent of overseas direct investment in the UK is from 
the US;
• One million Britons are employed by US companies in the UK and 
about a million Americans are employed by UK companies in the 
US;
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• 39 cents from every American dollar invested in the EU stops in 
the UK; 
• The US/UK trade relationship is worth $74bn, equally balanced 
between US and UK;
• Nearly 40 per cent of UK outward investment goes to the US; and
• The single largest country destination for UK exports is the US.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Anglo-American relations were impacted in the sense 
that Britain has found itself entangled in a new world order dominated entirely 
by the United States which is politically willing to reorder the world in a manner 
that best suits its national and security interest. In fact, the events of 9/11 have 
represented an extraordinary opportunity for Tony Blair. According to Parmar, 
“9/11 was seen as a repudiation of the Major’s squandering of the advantages of 
the special relationship and of cutting British military spending, and as a chance 
to consolidate and promote Britain’s interests (perceived by Blair) as leader of 
Europe  and  a  loyal  influential  ally  of  the  United  States  in  fighting  global 
terrorism’’, (2005, 218). These interests were manifested in Blair’s foreign policy 
speech in 1997, mentioned above; when he expressed his pride in his country and 
determination to ensure that “it provides leadership to the world”.      
Blair  emphasized  that  this  relationship  can  be  relied  on  in  order  to  tighten 
Britain’s global standing in the world and make others “listen”. By having the US 
backing Britain, Blair sees the increasing capability of his country to exercise a 
role  in  the  international  stage  that  would  influence  others  for  the  benefit  of 
Britain  of  course  even  if  that  required  the  exploitation  and  manipulation  of 
information like what happened in our case here when Blair  used a series of 
pretexts and justifications to sell the Iraq war to both his people and party as a 
justified war against terrorist regime threatening the world peace and order. This 
was in order to hide the real incentives behind that war; i.e., maintaining a strong 
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Anglo-American relationship that guarantees the protection of Britain’s national 
interests  within  the  new  unilateral  world  order  among  of  which  are  the 
influential role of Britain in the world, and economic prosperity and well-being. 
The political environment after 9/11 has been characterized by the message of 
President Bush is that the United States has to concern itself intimately with the 
rest of the world to ensure the safety and security of the nation and its citizens 
regardless of any multilateral approaches of which he described as “restraints’. 
Blair appealed to that ideology and nationalized its significance in the sense that 
a threat to the United States would be a threat to the United Kingdom. He fully 
accepted that bandwagoning with the US as the best approach to better achieve 
shared benefits and highlighted the danger allowing a number of competitive 
different poles to balance the US forces. 
In a unipolar world, a strategy of dependence on the US might have been the 
rational course, according to Dunne, capable of delivering the goals and interests 
of British foreign and security policy in a world newly order by the alliance of 
both the US and the UK (2004).  The British government,  faced with the new 
realities of a world dominated by a supersized power, found itself with no hard 
choices  but  to  follow the  steps  of  that  hegemon in  which  acting  outside  the 
UNSC would be interpreted as in the national security and where the evil means 
of war would be reconciled with the national interests. Giving up the UK’s goals 
of  internationalism,  multilateralism  and  morality  outlined  in  the  Strategic 
priorities of the FCO’s documents was an outcome of Blair’s loyalty to the US 
unipolarity.  According to  Dunne(2004),  being  a  loyal  ally  in  the  context  of  a 
hostile international system generated a convergence of interests across a range 
of  security  and defense  issues  especially  following the  events  of  9/11;  a  fact 
which pushed Blair to recalculate Britain’s interests and power differently. This 
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has resulted in the incompatibility between the US unipolarity, of which Blair 
sympathized with, and the British internationalism and multilateralism of which 
Blair had set as the main pillars of the UK foreign policy. 
The new international rules of the post 9/11 and the factors constituting the “war 
on terrorism” have incurred  a  systemic  change in  Blair’s  thinking  that  could 
unravel  that  incompatibility  or  contradiction.  Such  change  obligated  him  to 
bandwagon with the US although seen as a revisionist state by his European 
peers which seeks to alter the configuration of rules and institutions for pure 
national interests and power. For Blair, the relationship with the US represents a 
bargain in which full loyalty is bargained with influence over the direction of 
world affairs. Blair’s strategic vision and opportunity within this unipolar world 
of  the  US  and  its  war  against  ‘terrorism’  was  embodied  in  increasing  the 
effectiveness of Britain’s global role in the world especially after decades of the 
relative  economic  decline  coupled  with  an  uncertain  detached  role  in  the 
international affairs.  This would only be achieved through Britain’s ‘historical 
alliances’.  Of course, a historical alliance might also refer to the European allies 
as much as the Anglo-American special  relationship.  But Blair  refrained from 
falling in  the trap verbally  choosing  one over  the other  claiming that  Britain 
should be the bridge between both sides of the Atlantic. However, his deeds on 
the ground gave preference to the latter in which Europe represented another 
sphere of potential global influence to Blair’s Britain. 
According to Dunne, the primacy of the bilateral relationship with the US is not 
new in post 1945 British foreign policy. However, what is new is the replacement 
of the old rules by which the United States wished to play especially across a 
range of international issues for the purpose increasing its power and securing its 
national interest (2004, 908). Blair’s appeal to this unilateral disposition of the US 
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was affected by that systemic environment in which he decided to bandwagon 
with the it, although still allied with the Europeans on defense matters, in return 
of valuable deliverables most importantly the military update and oil. 
In such a unipolar world highly dominated by the US which sets the rules of the 
game and shapes the international  agenda,  Blair,  unlike  European allies,  was 
convinced of  a  one  state  imposing  its  own response  to  a  major  international 
threat. Through that, he aspired to share the prestigious triumph of the Iraq war 
in order to exploit his victor's prestige to sign Britain up for both the European 
single currency and a  new European Constitution.  He would do so with the 
praiseworthy  intention  of  leading  a  pro-American  bloc  within  the  EU  and 
cementing the Atlantic  alliance although this might be a far-fetched ambition 
since the EU constitution has its own rules and regulations that might restrain 
Blair. 
In sum, and restating Harries words, the idea of trying to act as an independent 
force or with partners other than the Americans was no longer seen as viable. As 
mentioned  above,  theorists  of  international  relations  have  coined  the  term 
bandwagoning  to  describe  the  policy  of  states  attaching  themselves  to  a 
dominant  power  in  the  hope  of  sharing  the  benefits  accruing  from  its 
domination.  Ever  since  the  Suez  Crisis,  Britain  has  been  the  world's  biggest 
practitioner of bandwagoning accommodating the American power for pure geo-
strategic interests(2001). 
So for Blair, the Anglo-American relationship remained a top priority in British 
foreign policy regardless of the language, terminology or approach of the ruling 
party in Britain. Among others, two main in-returns followed:
86
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
4.3 Nuclear Power
Although part of the European Union’s Strategy for Defence, the military alliance 
with the US is indispensable as mentioned above. Blair is aware of the fact that 
the military establishment of the UK is highly dependable on one nation and that 
is, the US. The reasons are common knowledge. Since the end of the Cold War, 
America’s  technical  superiority  on  the  battlefield  has  advanced by  leaps  and 
bounds beyond that of its allies. However, the British and other European allies 
spent the 1990s giving ever-higher priority to welfare over weaponry,  cutting 
back defence spending accordingly.
Hence, consulting his party, the parliament or the pubic opinion was not of a 
substantive prerequisite for Blair’s decision to go to war along the US. What was 
more important to Blair in this self help system is to maximize Britain’s military 
capability particularly the nuclear deterrent which can only be updated based on 
the  American  Programme.  Britain  cannot  be  independent  when dealing  with 
world  affairs  requiring  the  use  of  military  force  as  happening  nowadays. 
According to the defence white papers released in December 2003,  “the most 
demanding  expeditionary  operations,  involving  intervention  against  state 
adversaries, can only be plausibly conducted if US forces are engaged. In fact, UK 
forces  were  required  to  become  adjunct  of  the  US  command  and  control 
structures”  (as  quoted  in  newstatesmen,  November  2005).   Therefore,  any 
upgrade  in  high-tech  military  programmes  especially  the  nuclear  one  is 
dependent on the US. That is why Blair has renewed the 1958 mutual defence 
agreement underpinning nuclear cooperation with the US. This renewal of the 
agreement is best understood by the realist school of though which emphasizes 
the  military  build-up  as  the  primary  tools  for  security  and  survival  against 
threats of which Blair names ‘terrorism’ and ‘rogue states possessing WMD’. For 
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Blair, the best way to deter threats is by obtaining a counter threat. This is what is 
identified in realism as relative power by which a nation state can act, influence 
and manipulate other nation states to its own benefit.                  
4.4  Oil
The United States and the United Kingdom did not wage war on Iraq for the 
officially stated reasons as was explained previously. The world’s superpower 
and  its  key  ally  were  not  acting  because  they  feared  the  Iraqi  government’s 
weapons of mass destruction or its ties with the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Nor 
were they fighting to bring democracy to the Middle East, a region where the two 
governments had long supported reactionary monarchs and horrible dictators, 
including Iraqi president Saddam Hussein himself. 
According  to  Paul,  “war  was  primarily  a  “war  for  oil”  in  which  large, 
multinational oil companies and their host governments acted in secret concert to 
gain  control  of  Iraq's  fabulous  oil  reserves  and  to  gain  leverage  over  other 
national oil producers”, (2003).
To  understand  the  special  “national  security”  status  enjoyed  by  the  oil 
companies, we must first consider oil’s economic importance and then its central 
role in the war. 
Oil  provides  nearly  all  the  energy  for  transportation  (cars,  trucks,  buses 
airplanes, and many railroad engines). Oil also has an important share of other 
energy inputs – it heats many buildings and fuels industrial and farm equipment, 
for example. In addition, modern warfare particularly depends on oil, because 
virtually  all  weapons  systems rely  on oil-based fuel  –  tanks,  trucks,  armored 
vehicles,  self-propelled  artillery  pieces,  airplanes,  and  naval  ships.  For  this 
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reason, industrial countries’ governments view their companies’ global interests 
as  synonymous  with  the  national  interest  and  they  readily  support  their 
companies’  efforts  to  control  new  production  sources,  to  overwhelm  foreign 
rivals, and to gain the most favorable pipeline routes and other transportation 
and distribution channels. Just as governments like the US and the UK need oil 
companies  to  secure  fuel  for  their  global  war-making  capacity,  so  the  oil 
companies need their governments’ military power to secure control over global 
oilfields and transportation routes. It is no accident, then, that the world’s largest 
oil companies are located in the world’s most powerful countries.
In  fact,  according  to  Paul,  “the  oil  companies  have  always  enjoyed  “insider” 
privileges with the US and UK governments, resulting in many unique favours in 
the name of national security”, (2003). Even personal ties have existed between 
governments  and  executives  in  the  famous  oil  companies.  UK  oil  executives 
speak almost as unofficial members of government. In recent years, a number of 
personal ties stand out, especially the close friendship between Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and BP CEO John Browne (Lord Browne of Maddingley), (2003). In 
sum, both governments and oil companies supported each other to provide the 
nation with more oil supplies crucial for its wellbeing and economic welfare.
The Iraq war 2003 was no exception in a series of six previous conflicts dating 
back to 1914 to ensure full control over the Iraqi oil reserves. According to Paul, 
“Constant wars hint at the exceptional lure of Iraq’s oil fields. Iraq’s oil is 
of good quality, it exists in great quantity, and it is very cheap to produce, 
offering the world’s most extraordinary and profitable oil rents. Iraq’s oil 
is the world’s cheapest to produce, at a cost of only about $1 per barrel. 
The gigantic  “rent” on Iraq’s  oil,  during decades  of  production,  could 
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yield company profits in the range of $4-5 trillion dollars. Assuming fifty 
years of production and 40% royalties, Iraq could yield annual profits of 
$80-90 billion per year – more than the total annual profits of the top five 
companies, even in the banner year of 2003”, (2003). 
Such  astonishing  numbers  encouraged  many  countries  including  France, 
Germany, Russia, China and the US to sign oil contracts. However, as soon as the 
UK and the US signed those agreements in 1997, they started to deploy military 
forces near the country’s borders in a very threatening forward posture of which 
Operation Phoenix Scorpion and Operation Desert Thunder took place. In 2001, 
and nine days after the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration seems to have 
reached a near-decision on war with Iraq in the late spring of 2001. The events of 
September 11, 2001 and the US war on Afghanistan, postponed the timetable of 
operations,  but  may have helped solidify  the  support  of  the  UK ally”,  (Paul 
2003). 
In 2002/03,  US-UK forces  invaded Iraq on March 20,  2003,  seizing the major 
oilfields and refineries almost immediately. When coalition forces later entered 
Baghdad, they set a protective cordon around the Oil Ministry, while leaving all 
other institutions unguarded, allowing looting and burning of other government 
ministries,  hospitals  and  cultural  institutions.  Looters  sacked  the  National 
Museum and burned a wing of the National Library, but the Oil Ministry stood 
relatively unscathed, with its thousands of valuable seismic maps safe for future 
oil exploration (Paul 2003) which means that after the Iraq War of 2003, United 
States and United Kingdom oil  giants are certain to gain privileged access to 
Iraq’s oil resources. Excluded from control over Iraqi oil since the nationalization 
of  1972,  Exxon,  BP,  Shell  and Chevron will  now gain the  lion’s  share  of  the 
world’s most profitable oil fields. 
90
DECISION MAKING IN THE IRAQ WAR 2003: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF  TONY BLAIR’S FOREIGN POLICY       
                                                        
So, since the aftermath of the 11th September terrorist attacks against the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administration has been gearing up for 
a new war on Iraq to fulfil that aim. Plans existed to input 100,000 US troops into 
the  country,  coupled  with  a  new  bombing  campaign  to  topple  Saddam  and 
install  pro-West  elements  of  the  Iraqi  opposition.  The  US  and  British 
governments do not want democracy in the region. They do not want freedom 
and prosperity for the Iraqi people as they used in their justification to war. In 
fact, they never did, as is obvious from the fact that they were ultimately behind 
the installation and arming of Saddam himself. This is because the freedom and 
self-determination  of  the  Iraqi  people  would  mean that  they utilize  domestic 
resources as they please.
Thus,  according to  Ahmed,  the  Anglo-American partners  hope to  re-install  a 
brutal military dictatorship that suppresses the Iraqi people in order to secure 
unimpeded Western access to Persian Gulf oil reserves - albeit absent disobedient 
Saddam. In other words, they want a new Saddam-type entity to replace the old 
one who cannot be redeemed because he disobeyed Western orders. And like all 
previous Western military invasions of Iraq, the results are likely to be extremely 
bloody, with thousands of Iraqi civilian fatalities and casualties, and only more 
brutality  and  repression  under  yet  another  tyrant  installed  by  the  West. 
However,  these  costs  and  risks  are  unmentionable  when  it  comes  to  pure 
national interests of both countries as would realists such as Machiavelli suggest 
(2002). 
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5.  A  Literature  Review  of  the  Realist  Reading  of  Blair’s  Foreign  Policy 
Decision in the Iraq War
Behind the security case, the global case and the moralizing case which Blair has 
used extensively  to  manipulate  his  party,  the parliament  and his  people  into 
discovering the real causes behind the war, there exists a real motivation. This is 
the need to secure some world role by bandwagoning with the US and ensure 
Britain’s  safety  against  unknown security  threats.  Dumbrell  argues  that,  “the 
special  relationship  has  transcended  this  influence  to  fall  within  the  realist 
interpretations  of  international  relations  in  which  Britain  makes  use  of  the 
American power to preserve and protect its power position” (2001, 9). On the 
other  hand,  hyperrealists  such as  Kissinger  argue that:  “Middle  powers  used 
various  strategies  to  enhance  their  security  without  undue  sacrifice  of 
sovereignty.  Britain  chose  the  ‘special  relationship’  to  achieve  its  aims”  (as 
quoted in Dumbrell 2001, 13).  
‘Waxing fat on war’, the Iraq war came as a reflection to the customary relations 
between both countries since WWI. Wither argues that claiming that Iraq has 
linkage  to  world  terrorism  and  is  capable  of  deploying  weapons  of  mass 
destruction aggressively against Western countries, Blair was convinced of the 
inevitability of launching a war along with its most dependable ally to contain 
the security threat posed by the anarchic environment of the Iraqi regime as he 
perceived it to be a national interest (2003). As the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
put it in his comment on the lessons of 9/11 events: “The UK’s best interests are 
best served by an active and engaged global foreign policy working with our 
closest allies to push back the boundaries of chaos and resolve those persistent 
conflicts which threaten our security” (as quoted in Coates and Krieger 2004, 48). 
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Furthermore and based on what have been discussed earlier of the realist school 
of thought, Blair decided to bandwagon with the US, since it cannot be a threat to 
Britain’s survival. This was Blair’s best option to secure Britain’s survival in an 
anarchic environment (described earlier by Waltz) dominated by what he labels 
as ‘terrorism’ in order to increase his country’s control over that environment 
through expanding its spheres of influence and political interests abroad. This 
might take the form of offensive preemptive rather than defensive actions in an 
attempt to maintain both safety and gain as what happened in Afghanistan in 
2002 and Iraq in 2003. 
To maintain the basic interests mainly security and survival of a middle-power 
Britain against the uncertainties of world terrorism and use of weapons of mass 
destruction, Blair was convinced that bandwagoning with the hegemon with its 
vast military capabilities will reinforce Britain’s moderate military power(often 
called defensive diplomacy due to its inability to carry out a military offensive 
unilaterally)  and  guarantee  through  the  use  of  preemptive  force  to  secure 
Britain’s  survival  in  such  a  self-help-system as  well  other  influential  external 
interests that maximize its power both military and economic. Blair argues that 
“States developing weapons of mass destruction, proliferating them, importing 
or  exporting  the  scientific  expertise,  the  ballistic  missile  technology,  the 
companies and individuals helping them don't operate within any international 
treaties. They don't conform to any rules. The threat therefore is not imagined. 
The history of Saddam and WMD is not American or British propaganda. The 
history and the  present  threat  are  real.”  (quoted in  The Observer  2003).  It  is 
ironical;  however,  for  Blair  performed  without  abiding  by  the  rules  of 
international rules, yet he perceives states such as Iraq as a threat to Britain’s 
security, survival, economy, etc… Hence, intervening militarily under the cover 
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of morality and ethics (that are irrelevant to international relations) is a natural 
cost-efficient choice for Blair, according to the realist school of thought.  
Realism also holds that because security and survival are never assured in the 
international system, states seek to maximize their security by maximizing their 
relative power and influence where the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. As 
John Mearsheimer has put it, “the greater the military advantage one state has 
over  other  states,  the more secure it  is.”  (Quoted in  Labs  1999).  When states 
confront specific threats, states will attempt to increase their relative power. In 
the absence of specific threats such as in Blair’s case, however, states will still 
seek to maximize their power and influence because they cannot be sure when or 
where the next threat will arise. When they are presented with opportunities that 
will easily and cheaply increase their relative power, states will take advantage of 
them. A strategy that seeks to maximize security through a maximum of relative 
power is the rational response to anarchy. That is why bandwagoning with the 
United  States  was  a  prime  strategic  national  interest  for  Blair  despite  his 
alienation from the international rule of the UN, his public, his party, and his EU 
neighbors. The benefits(sharing the economic profits of the claimed liberalization 
of economy which opens the door for British and American trade and investment 
businesses  to  exploit  Iraq  oil  market  free  from  government  restrictions)  of 
maintaining the special relationship with the US exceeded those costs accrued 
from loosing the trust of the parties mentioned above (Curtis 2003).    
Curtis further argues that the ‘war on terrorism’ and punishment of perpetuators 
has provided a cover for a new military intervention carried out under Blair’s 
reign reconfiguring the country’s defensive role into an overtly offensive one. In 
this context, Blair is now taking Britain into a new focus of expeditionary warfare 
termed also as ‘preemptive war’ in which military power is projected overseas 
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coercively  under  many  pretexts  (as  has  been  discussed  earlier)  for  the 
advancement of the national interests described above(2003, 82).
Another benefit which motivated Blair to keep full loyalty to the US is described 
by Kettle who sees that Blair’s involvement in the Iraq war(although displaying 
all  sorts  of  justifications)  had the aim of  staying by the side of  the US in  an 
attempt to help Britain in shaping the world order in a manner that best serves its 
interests(2003). Bentley reiterating argues that Blair is trying to carve out a new 
and influential role for Britain in mediating and managing international conflict, 
as  well  as  in  influencing  the  decisions  of  the  US  (2003).  Although playing  a 
secondary role in that Anglo-American alliance to advance those benefits, Blair 
has continued, in the event of the Iraq war, the historical role of supporting the 
United  States  in  “sustaining  the  family  elites  in  the  Gulf  states  (who  acted 
completely in disregard of Blair’s assumed moral standards but at the same time 
offered  unrestrained  loyalty  to  the  special  relationship)  to  maintain  the 
traditional Middle East order and the global oil regime; promoting the economic 
liberalization in the world economy to benefit  US and British businesses; and 
finally  shaping the  parameters  of  action of  the  UN Security  Council”  (Curtis 
2003, 102). Within the framework of Blair’s unchanged foreign policy rhetoric, 
Blair says, “Britain’s national interest lay in staying closely allied with the United 
States. I tell you that we must stay close to America” (as quoted in Bowles 2003). 
“Blair’s  claim of  maintaining  the  international  order  and  stability  of  the  UN 
entails upholding the privileged position of the Anglo-American regime ensuring 
that  key  countries  and regions  particularly  those  key oil-producing countries 
remain under their  overall  control” (Curtis 2003,  14).  In this framework, Iraq, 
being the world’s second largest oil reserve, must be brought firmly under the 
Anglo-American  control  especially  that  Iraq  has  proved  to  be  defiant  non-
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submissive to that control; a fact which appeared to threaten the oil interests of 
the  Western  countries  mainly  the  US’s  and  Britain’s.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
“overthrowing  that  disobedient  regime  of  Saddam  under  the  pretext  of 
maintaining  the  international  order  and  protecting  human  rights  offers  oil 
companies of both counties such BP and Chevron the prospect of privatizing oil 
operations. The prize is indeed immense estimating at over $1 trillion foreign oil 
contract once the regime has changed” (Curtis 2003, 17). 
Zankaneh agrees with both Curtis and Azubuike that Blair’s deep involvement in 
the Iraq war has emanated from pure geopolitical realist motivations. She argues 
that Iraq constituted a natural choice for a ‘rogue state’ to be targeted in the name 
of ‘world terrorism’. Being the world’s second largest oil reserve containing more 
than 60% of the world’s known reserves(112.5 billion barrels) with weak military 
capabilities made it a vulnerable susceptible candidate for receiving the Anglo-
American ‘forced democracy’ and a great opportunity through which Blair can 
advance  the military,  economic  and diplomatic  interests  of  Britain  by allying 
with the hegemon (2005).
The American-led  war  against  Iraq  has  taken  over  the  Iraqi  oil  fields  which 
meant full accessibility to the oil supplies, control of oil prices and development 
oil contracts in favor of US and British companies that will in turn result in large 
economic profits and higher GDP’s. According to Chapman, “Blair has fervently 
supported  Bush  under  the  pretext  of  economic  liberalization  for  pure  geo-
strategic grounds mainly the exploitation of Iraq’s oil resources especially that 
the UK North Sea oil output has fallen by on-sixth since 2000. British oil exports 
now barely cover its imports; a fact which shall transform Britain shortly into a 
net oil importer” (2004).  However, the British oil industry can be put back to 
track where the oil reserves in Iraq were privatized. In fact, the benefits accrued 
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could estimate at 87.5 billion a year taking into consideration that the Iraqi oil 
could cost as little as 97 cents a barrel to produce compared to the UK’s North 
Sea oil produced at $3 to $4 per barrel(Macewan 2003).
Blair’s bandwagoning with the US serves the mutual longstanding interests in 
the  Middle  East.  Invading  Iraq  under  the  pretexts  of  regime  change,  Iraq’s 
disarmament  of  WMD,  promoting  democracy  and  human  rights  as  well  as 
fighting terrorism shall buy both countries a long-term presence in the region. 
According to Harris, this involves securing the oil fields, taking the means of oil 
production from the hands of the state, raising the production, controlling the oil 
price and benefiting the US and UK largest transnational oil corporations such as 
Exxon-Mobil (with profit of $15 billion in 2002), BP/ Amaco($8 billion), Anglo-
Dutch Shell($11 billion) and Chevron-Texaco(profits of which came in with $3.3 
billion) (2003, 60).
The Iraq war is considered to be a geopolitical war for interests whose aim is 
securing the oil supply(perceived a strategic interest for both Bush and Blair) by 
controlling the region especially that both the American and British economies 
have  become  energy  intensive  whereby  oil  constitutes  the  lifeline  of  the 
economies well-being. Peter (2004) further argues that an oil insecurity whether 
in terms of quantity, quality or price might leave these economies vulnerable and 
drive the concerned governments to coerce a war under various pretexts  and 
justifications to prevent any disobedient government from controlling the market 
especially that the demand for oil resources is expected to reach at a growth rate 
of 1.9%/ year which means 111.5 million oil barrels/ day. And since Blair knows 
the  military  limitations  of  his  country  to  project  power  in  the  Iraq  region 
unilaterally for the purpose of securing those oil fields, he had to join the US in 
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its war against Iraq with all the military capabilities it possessed to share gained 
profits  and capabilities.  This proved the realist  assumption that  in a self-help 
system,  Blair  acted  rationally  by  bandwagoning with the  US waged so  as  to 
preserve a national interest and in this case free and stable access to the Gulf oil.
So in sum, despite several contradictions and inconsistencies causing the largest 
parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years, opposition of over 120 of his 
Labour Party colleagues, protest of more than one million people, disagreement 
of the UK's major partners in Europe--France and Germany, and personal attacks 
by the media against the PM, Blair has decided eagerly to join the US-led war 
against Iraq based on several factors of which the realist school of thought was 
able to unravel. Of these factors were Blair’s Prime ministerial power which was 
exploited  fully  for  his  favorable  rational  course  of  action,  the  present 
international structure dominated by the hegemonic power of the US, the long-
standing special Anglo-American relationship inclusive of the institutionalized 
pattern of security and economic cooperation between the two countries, and an 
ambitious perception of Britain's role and power in the modern world. 
Putting the above into context and relying on the realist assumption of security, 
survival  and power,  one would easily explain Blair’s  insensitivity to both the 
domestic and European scenes. For Blair, what really mattered was the power of 
interests as he perceived them and those interests lied in “hugging” the US as 
close as possible to share geo-strategic benefits. Any other constraints or factors 
meant little to him.    
Indeed, Britain's position as a leading global player has been greatly enhanced in 
large part  due to Blair's  standing "shoulder  to shoulder"  with President Bush 
after  the  9/11  attacks.  Britain  is  the  only  nation  in  Europe  able  to  project 
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substantial military strength beyond the European continent and has emerged as 
the world's second most powerful military and political force in the new century. 
This power could not  be achieved if  Blair’s  Britain  sufficed from the defense 
agreements  with the EU. According to  Riddell,  by backing the Americans on 
Iraq,  Blair  was simply following a pattern of  British support  for  the  US in  a 
security crisis. Blair has been in a long line of British prime ministers in often 
putting the claims of transatlantic solidarity ahead of those of European unity. 
The most consistent feature of transatlantic relations has been the desire of British 
prime ministers to be insiders in the Washington policy debate. Indeed, every 
prime minister since 1945 except Ted Heath wanted a special relationship with 
the US on defense and intelligence. Even Harold Wilson, who refused American 
requests for British troops in Vietnam, gave strong diplomatic backing to the US 
in that war (Riddell  2003, 57).  So for Blair,  in terms of cost-benefit  terms, the 
Anglo-American relationship outweighs that of the Anglo-European and, thus, 
prioritized.
Another  reason  for  not  responding  to  Britain’s  key  European  allies  is  best 
explained by Kampfner who suggests that Blair’s view of reordering the world 
suggests  deliberately  using  armed  forces  overseas.  This  cannot  be  achieved 
unless the British forces are interoperable with the American forces and military 
technology of which the Europeans lack. In addition, Blair is well convinced that 
his way of approaching world affairs is incompatible with the European view 
that believes in multilateralism and diplomacy of which Blair is selective when to 
exploit and in what cases (2005). For Blair, it would have been inconceivable to 
follow Chirac and Schröder in opposing military action in Iraq reversing the 60-
year-old foundation of British foreign policy, as well as endangering American 
co-operation which was vital for the operations of Britain's Trident submarines 
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and for satellite intelligence since WWII.  Nor would it  have been feasible  for 
Britain  to  have adopted a  policy of  neutrality  or  mere diplomatic  support  as 
would any other  country of  less  importance  would do.  Thus,  Blair’s  optimal 
decision was to join the US and deliberately has chosen the Atlantic over the 
European by  claiming that  being strong on the  former side  would entail,  by 
default, strength on the latter one. 
Returning to the  domestic scene especially the public opinion, realism can also 
easily  explain  its  negligence  by  Blair.  However,  before  explaining  it,  let  us 
remind the reader of the public opinion at the time of running up to the war. In a 
2002August ICM poll quoted in the Guardian found that 52 percent of Britons 
were opposed to military action and just 33 percent were in favor. However, Blair 
was not worried much about both the overt and covert public protest since the 
majority of the British print media supported British participation in a regime 
change in Baghdad. The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Sun, and The Mail, 
with a combined readership of 19.2 million, all supported military action. The 
Labour-supporting publications, The Guardian, Independent, and Mirror, with 
7.3 million readers, are firmly opposed (Gardiner, 2002) 
Ironically,  the  hugely  popular  tabloid  newspaper  The  Sun,  with  a  daily 
circulation  of  4  million  copies,  is  loudly  beating  the  drum for  war.  The Sun 
played a leading role in bringing Blair to power in the last two general elections 
and has provided powerful backing for the Prime Minister over the Iraq issue 
(Gardiner,  2002).  This proves the fact that Blair  was at  comfort regarding the 
level of support from the public although that support came from the right both 
at the pubic level and the parliamentary majority. For him, this was no huge a 
concern. His concern was to lobby as much as possible in favor for his decision to 
go to the war. That is why he exploited a number of justifications and several 
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intelligence reports to support his political judgment which he already arrived at 
in  April  2002  in  agreement  with  President  Bush.  As  a  PM,  he  deployed  his 
authorities  as  a  PM and pursued a  policy  of  threat  exaggeration  in  a  bid  to 
persuade the public on the urgency of the war.
Based in  the  realist  assumptions  and Blair’s  style  of  leadership,  the domestic 
scene was marginalized when it came to Britain’s strategic interests. According to 
Doig and Phythian, Blair, as a Presidential Prime Minister, has allowed himself to 
operate in opposition of the public interest for the sake of the national interests 
(2005, 375). So whatever is said about democratic processes for taking a hard-
power-related decision, the government has the capability of taking the decision 
solely  such  as  defense  and  international  relations  when  it  feels  that  such 
decisions.  This  might  ignore  the  traditional  constitutional  approach  of 
parliamentary accountability, the political constraints of the party policies and 
the will of the people. As Doig and Pythian further argue:
“Such traditions continue to nurture the willingness of government to 
continue to take the lead on issues it  sees as relating to the national 
interest  but  for  which  the  rationale  and  justification  to  do  so  often 
restrains to harmonize with the demands of the democratic orthodoxy. 
The  pragmatic  development  of  British  political  and  governmental 
institutions and practices has meant that alongside expectations about 
openness,  democracy,  public  accountability  and  the  like,  there  have 
developed strong  traditions  and practices  concerning  the  day-to-day 
nation’s  business  which  live  very  uneasily  with  those  expectations”, 
(2005, 370).
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In a realist framework, Blair is seen to prefer the world of high politics where 
issues of security,  survival and interest matter in the international dimension. 
That is why Blair operated in terms of reasserting the British national interests 
stressing decisive leadership and authority. Consultation and responsiveness to 
the domestic  scene can be  seen as  advisable but  not  obligatory especially  on 
issues of the state interests. The decision to go to war was made among a group 
of elites and state officials close to Blair through which most of the details13 were 
concealed  from  other  political  figures  mainly  in  the  cabinet  and  parliament 
leaving them behind inhibiting them by a view that it is damaging to the national 
interest  in  case  they defied or  attempted to  defy.  For  Blair,  the  decision was 
neither a collective one nor requiring a legal justification despite the UN’s and 
Attorney General’s advice of the need of a legal framework. However, to achieve 
his goals, Blair intentionally chose to ignore those voices of institutionalism and 
multilateralism to find the legal justification in an outdated intelligence report of 
September 2002 where facts were exaggerated to garner a public support which 
would, if not taken seriously, might prevent the government from going into a 
war already committed to. Following the reports of both Hutton and Butler, the 
government  was  vindicated  and  so  Blair  has  to  pinpoint  the  failure  of  the 
intelligence (which served both the cause and camouflage to side with the US in 
the run up to the war) is to be blamed and consequently started to look for other 
justifications to face the skeptical domestic scene only in order to maintain his 
commitment to the US without revealing the real motivations.  
13 As per two memos leaked to the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Times in 2004 and 2005 
consecutively, the decision to go to war was taken in April 2002 when Blair met with Bush in his 
ranch in Crawford, Texas despite the advise from both the intelligence officials, Jack Straw, Defense 
Secretary and Attorney General that the case against Saddam was extremely thin and lacks the 
legal basis, (Doig and Pythian 2005, 372. 
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6. Conclusion 
Throughout  my  thesis,  I  attempted  to  explain  the  seemingly  contradictory 
behaviour  of  Blair  during  the  Iraq  war  2003  and  the  real  explanations  that 
contributed to Blair’s foreign policy decision to join the US-led war. Surveying 
the discrepancy between Blair’s New Labour Policy and Blair’s political action in 
the war, I established the hypothesis that both the pluralist and moralist rhetoric 
borrowed by Blair’s from his Third Way Labourism was only cleverly exploited 
to generate justifications-mainly three-to try to gain the public  support  of  his 
decision to join the US on its war against Iraq. 
In an attempt to understand that discrepancy, I divided the main hypothesis into 
two  main  realist-based  hypotheses  with  particular  focus  on  the  international 
structure (9/11 events and dominance of the US) and the vitality of interests: 
military power and oil shares. This was in attempt to explain the case clearly. 
Blair’s  unprecedented support  to the US following the 9/11 attacks has been 
unconditionally  generous  both verbally  and militarily  compared to  any other 
American ally. Seeking the American goodwill has been the utmost priority for 
British policy-makers for decades and the September 11th attacks have appeared 
to give Blair the chance to cement Britain’s position as the number one ally to the 
US,  a  country  on  whose  friendship  and  cooperation  Britain’s  diplomatic 
influence,  security,  and world  role  still  largely  depend  (Azubuike  2003,  77). 
Blair’s closeness to the US was needed “to secure a world role and buy Britain an 
insurance  against  some  unknown  rainy  day  especially  after  1956  Suez  had 
highlighted  Britain’s  inability  to  play  an  independent  world  role”  (2003,  72). 
Blair’s insistence on maintaining a strong relationship with the US remains in the 
advancement of Britain’s national interests if explained from the viewpoint of the 
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anarchical  self-help  structure  described  by  Waltz  above.  In  fact,  through  the 
policy  of  bandwagoning  rather  than  balancing,  the  US  offers  a  tremendous 
reinforcement of British power and capabilities;  thus guaranteeing its security 
and international influence. It also offers Britain the support it needs to upgrade 
its military build-up, mainly the nuclear one, and secure the oil shares necessary 
for its well-being especially in the absence of unrestricted flow of other energy 
resources worldwide.
I  resorted  to  the  realist  school  of  thought  following  the  failure  of  both  the 
normative viewpoint of international relations and the pluralist school of thought 
of understanding the seemingly contradictory policy of Blair as well as his real 
motivation for the war. After discussing the arguments and counterarguments of 
the justifications used by Blair-which are based in his Third Way Labourism- 
both approaches proved their incapability of explaining the case. Why?
The answer would be in  Blair’s negligence of both the UN, as an international 
institution,  and the  public  as  part  of  the  British  society,  Blair’s  preference  of 
bandwagoning with the US over his alliance with his European allies’ mainly 
France  and  Germany,  underestimation  of  the  UN  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Americans,  ignorance  of  the  public  protest,  dependence  on  the  pro-war 
Conservative party rather than his own in winning a parliamentary vote over 
Iraq,  the  defiance  and  manipulation  of  the  legal  institution  embodied  in  the 
advice  given  by  Attorney  General  Goldsmith,  and the  misuse  of  morals  and 
values to publicize his agenda and garner support for his cause.
It  can  be  concluded,  based  on  the  above  arguments  and  evidences  in  the 
preceding three chapters, that the Iraq war has nothing to do with what Blair 
revealed about the need to maintain the international order, the proliferation of 
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the  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  the  moral  duty  to  fight  terrorism and 
protect the Iraqi human rights. In fact, those were only pretexts exploited by Blair 
to legitimize his interests embodied in maintaining the close relationship with the 
US(unchangeable foreign policy pillar), guaranteeing Britain’s influential role on 
the international table, securing the oil supply along with other related strategic 
interests whether economic, military, or diplomatic ones. 
That has been facilitated by Blair’s  style  of  leadership displaying elements of 
centralization in the hands of the PM along with a number of (usually) unelected 
elites which transformed the Cabinet government into a prime ministerial one 
with  huge  power  invested  in  ‘one  single  man’  whose  powers  have  steadily 
increased.  Influencing the  PM’s  government  policy through parliament,  focus 
groups, party members, or even the public has been minimal. This has paved the 
way for Blair to make the decision of the Iraq war with the consultation of a 
relatively  small  number  of  people  without  properly  consulting  either  cabinet 
members  or  parliament  members.  As  mentioned above,  this  centralization  of 
power called ‘elective dictatorship’ by Lord Hailsham in 1976 has also led to the 
ignorance of the public, the legitimizing power behind Blair’s leadership.
According to realism, exchanging short-term political advantages for the national 
interest of the state is  what characterizes the behaviour of the statesmen who 
think and act only in terms of the power of interests. That can explain why Blair 
insisted on joining the war knowing that this might highly damage his reputation 
domestically, at home, and regionally, at the European level. 
In conclusion, preserving his country’s interests (special relationship with the US, 
security,  survival,  economic  welfare,  oil  shares,  diplomatic  influence,  and 
military enhancement) Blair  could not operate on the basis of  laws and open 
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cooperative  security.  But  rather  revert  to  the  methods  of  force,  pre-emptive 
attack,  and deception,  whatever  is  necessary  to  secure  his  country’s  strategic 
interests. Although convincing both the domestic and international players that 
he is behaving according to the world of law and order, Blair, in the Iraq war, has 
proved, that he only propagated for this argument to conceal his true belief of the 
Hobbesian world, where military power remains a key feature of international 
relations whereby only national interests count.
Throughout my thesis, I utilized the assumptions of the realist school of thought 
mentioned above to explain Tony Blair’s foreign policy decision in the Iraq War 
2003. Based on that school, I concluded that Blair’s choice of joining the war is the 
rational alternative given the circumstances present in the international system 
particularly following 9/11 events, the dominance of the US as the hegemon of 
the world and the benefits ensued from tightening the special relationship with 
that hegemon. That choice made him sacrifice the moral argument (whether he 
believed in it or not) in his New Labourist discourse and loose the idealist set of 
values to the realist argument. Machiavelli tries to explain that by stating that 
there are times when doing what is necessary to promote the interests of the state 
contradict  the morality of the community.  A decision maker  must  have moral 
flexibility, knowing when and when not to conform to the ordinary morality of the 
masses. A Prince knows when to obey the morality of the state, the morality of 
politics which dictates that right behavior maximizes the power of the state and 
the national interests. An action is immoral (politically) if it does not serve the 
interest  of  the  state  even  though  that  action  might  be  considered  moral  by 
conventional standards. For Machiavelli, and all those who consider themselves 
realists, if a political decision-maker is more concerned with his or her soul than 
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the interest of the state, they have no business being in politics14. According to 
Morgenthau, “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without 
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, 
then, considers prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political 
actions-to be the supreme virtue in politics”, (1978, 4-15). For realism, Blair has 
weighed both costs and benefits to the consequence of his decision and reached 
the choice of going to war so as to incur as much long-term possible interests as 
possible  within  the  framework  of  reviving  the  Anglo-American  special 
relationship  following  9/11  events  particularly  that  America  has  become  the 
hegemon that has the power to change the world to suit its interests. 
Although  the  realist  school  of  thought  gave  rational  explanation  for  Blair’s 
behavior  in  the  Iraq  war  particularly  comprehending  the  reasons  for  Blair  to 
ignore public, international organizations and most importantly the moral set of 
values  displayed in  Blair’s  discourse,  I  feel  the  urge to  criticize  Blair  for  his 
decision.
Blair’s  concealment  behind  a  whole  set  of  justifications  such  punishing  the 
perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, fighting rogue states that threaten world peace 
and  human  rights  through  developing  WMD  ,  spread  of  democracy  and 
eradication  of  poverty  and  injustice  proved  to  hide  realist  motivations.  The 
security-related  justifications  were  contradicted  by  the  British  Intelligence 
Agencies themselves; the moral arguments were scorned by a significant section 
of the public aware of the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by the Anglo-
American driven sanctions on Iraq. The argument of spreading democracy is in 
14 http://www.cascadia.ctc.edu/Faculty/jmiller/POL102/realism.html. Accessed 
19/9/2005
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itself contradictory and ironic when one looks at the list of the repressive regimes 
supported by Britain under the rule of Blair  such as Israel,  Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia which are known for their human rights violations and . Not only that, but 
Blair  has  preempted  democracy  as  a  principle  from  all  meanings  when  he 
deliberately  chose  not  to  listen  to  either  his  public  or  parliament.  Even  the 
consultations that he made with the Attorney General and the parliament were 
only to ensure the support of a decision he had already made with President Bush 
when the Prime Minister “promised to be 'solidly behind' US invasion with or 
without UN backing”, (Taylor 2006). According to Taylor, a memo of a two-hour 
meeting between the two leaders at the White House on January 31 2003 - nearly 
two months before the invasion -  reveals  that Mr.  Bush made it  clear the US 
intended to invade whether or not there was a second UN resolution and even if 
UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme. "The 
diplomatic  strategy  had  to  be  arranged  around  the  military  planning",  the 
president told Mr. Blair. The prime minister is said to have raised no objection. 
He  is  quoted  as  saying  he  was  "solidly  with  the  president  and  ready  to  do 
whatever  it  took  to  disarm  Saddam"  (Taylor  2006).  This  shows  that  all  the 
justifications exploited were only a camouflage to run away from the democratic 
constraints which normally obligate a democratically elected leader to behave in a 
certain manner; a fact which portrays Blair as a liar who deceived his own people 
and dragged them into a web of deceitful arguments. Blair’s hypocrite messianic 
promise to reorder the world so as to preserve peace and harmony is  only an 
embodiment of pure imperialism and double standards. 
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6.1 Recommendation
Kofi Anan, in September 2004, has said: “The US-led invasion of Iraq was an 
illegal act that contravened the UN Charter”. 
A report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Iraq described the Anglo-
American practice of denying food and water to the Iraqi civilians in order to 
force  them to  leave  their  towns  and villages  as  a  “flagrant  violation”  of  the 
Geneva Convention.
I would like to recommend studying Blair’s behaviour in the Iraq war in terms of 
the legal point of view. Was he really behaving in terms of the International Law, 
treaties and agreements? If not, will the world allow him to escape justice or will 
they speak for the rule of law and put him on trial as it is the case with Saddam? 
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